RL30588
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
May 22, 2009
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Summary
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service Summary Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and Pakistans inability to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. The Obama Administration conducted a strategic review, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, in advance of a March 31, 2009 international meeting in the Netherlands and an April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration which led to decisions in 2008 to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In part because of the many different causes of continued instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were some differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. Apparently leaning toward those in the Administration who do not believe that more combat troops will reverse U.S. difficulties, the review focuses not on adding U.S. troopsalthough at least 21,000 are being added in 2009 but rather on enhancing non-military steps. The thrust of the strategy is to increase the resources devoted to economic development and coordination among international donors, building Afghan governing structures primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistans efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The review also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process, and Afghan-led reconciliation talks reportedly have expanded since the strategy was announced. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics are needed and in May 2008, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was removed and Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal was named to succeed him. Although U.S. officials have become disillusioned with the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, some experts believe there is substantial progress to build on, including completion of the post-Taliban political transition with adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, presidential elections in October 2004, parliamentary elections in September 2005, and the relative absence of violent ethnic conflict. The parliament has become an arena for formerly armed factions to resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on Karzai. Afghan citizens, including women, are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Karzai will be tested politically in the presidential and provincial elections planned for August 20, 2009, although the field of opponents is divided and relatively weak. The United States and partner countries deploy a 58,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan. Of those, about 26,000 of the 40,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF; the remainder (about 14,000) are under Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police forcethe two combined now total about 165,000. The United States has given Afghanistan well over $32 billion since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $15 billion was to equip and train the security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
