RL30588
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
June 18, 2009
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Summary
Upon and since taking office, the Obama Administration has faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban and other militants from safe havens in Pakistan. The Obama Administration conducted a strategic review, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, in advance of an April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, which produced decisions to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In part because of the many different causes of continued instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. Apparently leaning toward those in the Administration who do not believe that more combat troops will reverse U.S. difficulties, the new strategy focuses not on adding U.S. troopsalthough at least 21,000 are being added in 2009. It emphasizes instead non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistans efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics are neededdesigned primarily to protect the population and promote governance and developmentand in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was removed and Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal was named to succeed him. Although U.S. officials have become critical of the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzaiparticularly his decision to rely on strong regional faction leaderssome experts believe that there is substantial progress to build on, including completion of the post-Taliban political transition with adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, presidential elections in October 2004, parliamentary elections in September 2005. Others say Karzais relatively conciliatory approach to governing accounts for the absence of violent ethnic conflict. The parliament has become an arena for formerly armed factions to resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on Karzai. Afghan citizens, including women, are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Karzai will be tested politically in the presidential and provincial elections planned for August 20, 2009, although the field of opponents is divided and relatively weak. The additional U.S. forces now flowing to Afghanistan are reinforcing the approximately 40,000 U.S. troops there previously. Of those 40,000, about 26,000 are part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates throughout Afghanistan. The remainder are under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police forcethe two combined now total about 165,000. Assuming all requested FY2009 funds are appropriated, the United States will have provided almost $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $18 billion was to equip and train the security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
