Download Locations
Summary
Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. The Obama Administration conducted a strategic review, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, in advance of an April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, which produced decisions to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In part because of the many different causes of instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. The review apparently leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance, although 21,000 U.S. troops are being added during May - September 2009. The new strategy emphasizes non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistans efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics are needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was removed and replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Although U.S. officials have become critical of the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzaiparticularly his decision to rely on regional faction leaderssome experts believe that there is substantial progress to build on, including completion of the post-Taliban political transition with adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, presidential elections in October 2004, parliamentary elections in September 2005. Others say Karzais relatively conciliatory approach to governing accounts for the absence of violent ethnic conflict. The parliament has become an arena for formerly armed factions to resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on Karzai. Afghan citizens, including women, are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Karzai will be tested politically in the presidential and provincial elections planned for August 20, 2009, although the field of opponents is divided and relatively weak. The additional U.S. forces now flowing to Afghanistan are reinforcing the approximately 40,000 U.S. troops there previously. Of those, most are part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates throughout Afghanistan. The remainder are under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police forcethe two combined now total about 165,000. The United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $18 billion was to equip and train the security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.





