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Summary

Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a fistrategic review,fl the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance, although the review did announce an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops by September 2009. The strategy emphasizes non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan™s efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics that limit civilian casualties and holds territory cleared of insurgents was needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was removed and replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Although U.S. officials have become critical of the leadership of Afghan President Hamid KarzaiŠparticularly his decision to rely on regional faction leadersŠsome experts believe that there is substantial progress to build on, including completion of the post-Taliban political transition with adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, presidential elections in October 2004, parliamentary elections in September 2005. Others say Karzai™s relatively conciliatory approach to governing accounts for the absence of violent ethnic conflict. The parliament has become an arena for formerly armed factions to resolve differences, as well as a center of political pressure on Karzai. Afghan citizens, including women, are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Karzai will be tested politically in the presidential and provincial elections on August 20, 2009, which are being held amid major security difficulties, although Karzai remains the favorite for re-election, according to recent polls. Of the approximately 63,000 U.S. forces that will be in Afghanistan by September 2009, most are part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates throughout Afghanistan. The remainder are under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police forceŠthe two combined now total about 165,000. The United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $18 billion was to equip and train the security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

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