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Summary

This CRS Report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. There are two other relevant elements of the "one China" policy: the August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to Taiwan. (For more discussion, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy -- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley Kan.) Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been increasingly significant. In addition to transfers of hardware, the United States has expanded military exchanges with Taiwan after the PRC's missile exercises in 1995-1996, and has conducted assessments of Taiwan's defense needs. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for sale to Taiwan: diesel-electric submarines (perhaps a foreign design with U.S. systems), P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), 4 decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. He also deferred approval for Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's July 2002 report to Congress on PRC military power. The Administration and others have questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense and protection of national security information. Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or other action. One policy issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in assisting Taiwan's defense -- including arms sales as well as military exchanges -- as Taiwan faces the PLA's missile buildup and arms acquisitions, primarily from Russia. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan. A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration's policy has affected these trends, including any policy reviews or changes concerning arms sales to and military relations with Taiwan. A question arose in 2001 when President Bush committed the United States to do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself." Another catalyst for this debate arose out of the U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX, in October 2002, when PRC leader Jiang Zemin reportedly offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China's buildup of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S. security assistance for Taiwan. In February 2003, the Administration pointed to three priorities for Taiwan: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. This CRS Report concludes with a table on major defense sales to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. This report will be updated as warranted.

Related Reports:
• RL30957

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