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Summary

This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" made to Taiwan. (Also see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy -- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley Kan.) Despite the absence of diplomatic relations or a defense treaty, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been increasingly significant. In addition, the United States has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale: diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegisequipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. The Administration and others have questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. U.S. officials have strongly urged Taiwan's legislature to pass a Special Budget (re-submitted in early 2005 at US$15.5 billion) for PAC-3 missile defense systems, P-3C ASW aircraft, and submarines. Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or other action. One issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in applying leverage to improve Taiwan's self-defense as well as to maintain peace and stability. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining security assistance, defense commitments, or policy reviews. A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration's management of policy has affected these trends. A question arose in April 2001 when President Bush committed the United States to do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself." As Taiwan's president called for referendums and a new constitution, Bush stated, along side the visiting PRC premier in the Oval Office in December 2003, that "the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose." In the 109th Congress, some Members in the House wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in January 2005 to express concerns that the Bush Administration has delayed notifications to Congress on selling the three major defense systems.

Related Reports:
• RL30957

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