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Summary

This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty with Taiwan. At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegisequipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as described in the Pentagon's reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February 2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. Some in the United States have questioned Taiwan's seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending, and protection of secrets. The Pentagon has broadened its focus from Taiwan's arms purchases to its regular defense budget, readiness for self-defense, and critical infrastructure protection. Blocked by the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY), the Special Budget (not passed) for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems was cut from $18 billion in 2004 to $9 billion (for submarines only) in 2005. In March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister requested a 2006 Supplemental Defense Budget (not passed) in part for submarine procurement, P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). In June 2007, the LY passed Taiwan's 2007 defense budget with funds for P-3C planes, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16C/D fighters. While the LY did not commit to buy subs, in December 2007, it approved $62 million to start the design phase. The Navy accepted Taiwan's formal request for this phase. Since then, congressional concerns have increased about the lack of notifications to Congress by the President on eight pending arms sales programs as well as his refusal to accept Taiwan's request for F-16C/D fighters. Another concern is the Administration's refusal to brief Congress. These concerns involve the issue of whether the President has complied with the TRA and policy, including the required congressional role in arms sales. S. 1565 and H.R. 3912 would authorize a sale of excess naval minehunters. In October 2007, the House passed H.Res. 676 to urge the President to consider Taiwan's interest since 2006 in buying F-16C/D fighters. On September 23, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6646 to require detailed briefings to Congress. The next day, Representative Tancredo introduced H.R. 7059 to require progress in pending arms sales notwithstanding formal notifications to Congress.

Related Legislation:
• S.1565
• H.R.3912
• H.R.6646
• H.R.7059
• S.2007
• H.RES.676

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