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Summary:
The Obama Administration is facing a security environment in Iraq vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007. The turnaround has been widely attributed to the troop surge announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (New Way Forward). Recent Defense Department reports assess that overall frequency of violence is down to levels not seen since 2003, yet insurgents are still able to conduct high profile attacks in several major cities. These attacks have not caused a modification of the February 27, 2009, announcement by President Obama that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010, leaving a residual presence of 35,000 50,000 U.S. trainers, advisers, and mentors, with these to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. This drawdown is in line with a U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, ratified by Iraqs parliament on November 27, 2008. However, some believe that insurgents will take advantage of the drawdown and that a U.S. military presence might be needed beyond 2011 to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. U.S. officials worry that the many remaining political disputes, as well as some that are escalating, pose a threat to stability. These disputes played out in the context of the January 31, 2009, provincial elections in fourteen of Iraqs eighteen provinces. The elections went ahead peacefully and produced a victory for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his allies, but also may have widened the split between Maliki and other erstwhile Shiite allies. The elections did not reduce tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Maliki over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas and local energy development. The progress in 2008 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Husseins regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraqs government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costswithout clear movement toward national political reconciliationstimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, U.S. economic and security aid to Iraq is being reduced. For further information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
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