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• U.S. Department of State

Summary

In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as required by U.N. Security Council resolutions and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In September 2002, the President warned that unless Iraq fully disarmed in cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States would lead a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily. U.S. officials made clear that this would include the ouster of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein's regime. On March 19, 2003, the United States launched "Operation Iraqi Freedom," a war effort to disarm Iraq and change its regime. The regime fell on April 9. In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament, including liberation from an oppressive regime for the Iraqi people and enhancement of the prospects for peace and democracy throughout the Middle East. The goal of regime change in Iraq had been declared U.S. policy since November 1998, and U.S. efforts to oust Saddam had been pursued, with varying degrees of intensity, since the end of the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily involved U.S. financial backing for opposition groups inside and outside Iraq, several of which are now contending for power in post-Saddam Iraq. Past efforts to change the regime floundered because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq's several overlapping intelligence and security forces. Previous U.S. administrations ruled out major U.S. military action to change Iraq's regime, believing such action would be costly, risky, and not necessarily justified by the level of Iraq's lack of compliance on WMD disarmament. The character of the government that will replace Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, and the exact process by which that government will be chosen, are yet to be determined. Some Administration officials reportedly had hoped that major military and governmental defections from the Hussein regime would serve as the core of a successor government. However, no senior Hussein regime figures defected, and established opposition groups and emerging local leaders will likely form the core of a new regime. Some of these groups are urging the United States to begin establishing a self-rule authority soon, but the Bush Administration has delayed plans to do so, apparently believing that democratic institutions must be built before power can be handed to an all-Iraqi authority. This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.

Related Legislation:
• S.2002

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