RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
October 04, 2007

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Summary

Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence and increased violent competition among Shiite groups as well. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. In order to halt the apparent deterioration in conditions in Iraq in 2006, President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward") consisting of deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ("troop surge") to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support in Anbar Province for U.S. policy. The strategy is intended to provide security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as "benchmarks" of political progress. The FY2007 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 110-28, linked some U.S. reconstruction aid to progress on the eighteen named benchmarks, but allows for a presidential waiver to continue the aid even if little or no progress is observed in Administration reports due July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007. According to both Administration reports, as well as September 2007 testimony by General David Petraeus and Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, the Baghdad security plan has made progress on several military indicators and some political indicators, but overall national political reconciliation has not progressed substantially. The Administration reports are corroborated, to some extent, by an August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate A required report by the GAO released September 4, 2007, assesses less progress on security benchmarks than does the Administration and is pessimistic, as is the NIE, on the prospects for political reconciliation. Some in Congress -- as well as the Iraq Study Group -- believe that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. However, in the face of the Administration's insistence on pursuing the "New Way Forward" strategy that the Administration says is starting to show results, there has not been the needed level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy. On the other hand, some see the recent passage of a Senate amendment supporting a more decentralized Iraq as outgrowth of efforts to build a bipartisan consensus for an alternative Iraq strategy. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.

    Related Legislation:
  • S.2196

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