RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
November 30, 2007
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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq became violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, violent competition among Shiite groups as well, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably deliver services. Compounding the internal violence has been growing tension on Iraq's northern border with Turkey, and Iranian assistance to armed Shiite groups operating in southern Iraq and in Baghdad. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. In late 2007, the Administration is claiming relative success in reversing the deterioration in security in 2006, attributing the gains to the strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward"). The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ("troop surge") to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. However, critics say that the strategy was primarily intended to promote Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as "benchmarks" of political progress. According to congressionally mandated White House reports in July and September 2007, as well as subsequent events, overall national political reconciliation has not progressed substantially, and U.S. officials are looking for more modest signs of political "accommodation"rather than broad, sweeping reconciliation. Some in Congress believe that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq, whether or not a unified central government is fully stabilized. However, partly because there is a perception that the troop surge strategy is reducing violence, there has not been the needed level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy. A FY2008 supplemental appropriations bill to fund Iraq (and Afghanistan) war operations, H.R. 4156, passed by the House, would set as a goal December 15, 2008 for a withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq, with exceptions for performance of more limited missions. Some see the September 2007 passage of a Senate amendment supporting a more decentralized, "federal" Iraq as outgrowth of efforts to build a bipartisan consensus for an alternative Iraq strategy. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
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Related Legislation:
- H.R.4156
- S.2196
