RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
February 21, 2008
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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was highly violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention - a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism could be achieved, and at what cost. The Administration is now claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security that became acute by the end of 2006, attributing the gains to a "troop surge" strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward"). The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. Some commanders say that violence has been reduced to levels not seen since 2004. Critics say that the strategy has not, to date, accomplished its primary intent to promote Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as "benchmarks" of political progress and that any security gains are therefore tenuous. The Administration argues that legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress that was envisioned by the surge strategy. The Administration believes that the current U.S. strategy, if continued with only modest reduction in U.S. forces and continued building of Iraq's security forces is likely to produce sustainable stability -- a central government able to defend itself with progressively reduced U.S. help. However, some in Congress believe that any progress is likely to unravel without unsustainably high levels of U.S. forces, and that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq, whether or not a unified central government is fully stabilized. Partly because there is a perception that the troop surge is succeeding, there has not been the needed level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy. Some see the September 2007 passage of a Senate amendment to the FY2008 defense authorization act (P.L. 110181) supporting a more decentralized, "federal" Iraq as a product of efforts to build a bipartisan consensus for an alternative Iraq strategy. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
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Related Legislation:
- S.2196
