RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
June 26, 2008
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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was wracked by violence caused by Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. At the same time, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention -- a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism -- could ever be achieved, and, if so, at what cost. The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security that had become acute by the end of 2006, attributing the gains to a "troop surge" strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward"). The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. Defense Department assessments in June 2008 say that overall violence is down as much as 80% since early 2007, to levels not seen since 2004, but that progress can be "fragile and tenuous" if not accompanied by national reconciliation and economic development. This fragility was demonstrated in March-April 2008 by an outbreak of intense and widespread fighting between Shiite-dominated government forces and Shiite militias. The Administration argues that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was envisioned by the surge, but critics differ with the degree of such political progress. A delay in provincial council elections, planned for October 1, 2008, is now virtually certain. Going forward, the Administration believes that the current strategy -- "conditionsbased" gradual reductions in U.S. forces and continued building of Iraq's security forces -- is likely to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. Some in Congress believe that the noted security progress is unsustainable without high levels of U.S. forces, and that winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq would compel Iraqi leaders to reach needed political compromises. Partly because there is a perception that the troop surge is succeeding, there has not been the required level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy, although there appears to be growing support for compelling Iraq to fund key functions now funded by the United States. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
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Related Legislation:
- S.80
- S.2196
