RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
October 02, 2008
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Summary
The Administration is claiming success in significantly reducing violence in Iraq as a result of the "troop surge" announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward"). With the 28,500 "surge" forces withdrawn as of July 2008, Defense Department reports assess that overall violence is down as much as 80% since early 2007, to levels not seen since 2004. Additional drawdowns are planned for early 2009, but U.S. commanders say that progress as "fragile and tenuous" until the degree of political reconciliation and economic development can be more fully institutionalized and assessed. They recommend that measured, incremental "conditions-based" reductions in U.S. forces, continued building of Iraq's security forces, and likely further political progress in Iraq -- are needed to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. While commanders remain cautious on further U.S. force drawdowns, the Administration argues that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is increasingly recognized as capable, and that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that the surge was designed to facilitate. Provincial council elections, originally planned for October 1, 2008, and considered crucial to further reconciliation, are now planned for January 2009 under a newly passed election law. Yet, there are growing tensions between the Shiite-dominated government and those Sunni leaders and fighters who have been key to stabilizing large parts of Iraq, as well as continued concerns over the degree to which the Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr will integrate into the political process. Maliki's insistence on a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal and other demands have held up finalizing a U.S.-Iraq agreement that would govern the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq beyond December 2008. The progress comes after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violence Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without clear movement toward national political reconciliation -- stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention -- a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism -- could ever be achieved, and at what cost. Partly because there is a perception that the troop surge has succeeded, there has not been the required level of support in the 110th Congress to mandate a timetable for withdrawal. There is growing U.S. support for compelling Iraq, which anticipates large surpluses attributed to high oil prices, to fund key functions now funded by the United States. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
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Related Legislation:
- S.80
- S.2196
