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Summary

As it left office, the Bush Administration claimed it was handing off to President Obama a security environment in Iraq that is vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007. It attributes that ?turnaround? to the ?troop surge? announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (?New Way Forward?). Recent Defense Department reports assess that overall violence is down at least 65% from late 2007 levels, to levels not seen since 2004. A major issue is that President Obama has indicated that stabilizing Afghanistan should be a higher priority for the United States than Iraq and has reportedly indicated to U.S. commanders that the U.S. presence in Iraq needs to begin shrinking. However, some U.S. commanders say that the progress in Iraq is ?fragile? and could be jeopardized by a too rapid draw-down and are reportedly recommending gradual reductions in U.S. forces and continued building of Iraq?s security forces. A slow draw down would allow time for further political progress to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. A U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement (SOFA), ratified by Iraq?s parliament on November 27, 2008, mandates a U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011, although President Obama has said a ?residual presence? of U.S. forces might be needed beyond that time. U.S. officials worry that the many political disputes that remain, and some of which are escalating, still pose a threat to stability. These disputes played out in the context of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections in fourteen of Iraq?s eighteen provinces. These elections went ahead peacefully and produced a victory for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his allies, but did not necessarily produce the expected full integration into the political process of those Sunni leaders and fighters who have been key to stabilizing large parts of Iraq, or the Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr. The elections also may have widened the split between Maliki and other erstwhile Shiite allies, and did not reduce tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Prime Minister Maliki over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas and local energy development. deterioration. The progress in 2008 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Hussein?s regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq?s government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs?without clear movement toward national political reconciliation? stimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, there is growing U.S. support in Congress for compelling Iraq to fund key functions now funded by the United States. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

Related Legislation:
• S.2196

Related Reports:
• RL31339
• RL31339

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