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Summary

The Obama Administration began with a security environment in Iraq vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007. The turnaround has been widely attributed to the troop surge announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (New Way Forward). Recent Defense Department reports assess that overall violence is down about 90% from late 2007 levels, to levels not seen since 2003. On February 27, 2009, President Obama announced that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010, leaving a residual presence of 35,000 50,000 U.S. trainers, advisers, and mentors, although some might still be in combat in some circumstances. Some believe that a large U.S. presence still is required to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror, and there is concern that violence might increase as U.S. troops are drawn down. A U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement (SOFA), ratified by Iraqs parliament on November 27, 2008, mandates a complete U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011, although it is possible that this time frame could be renegotiated if President Obama decides a U.S. presence is still needed to secure Iraq. U.S. officials worry that the many remaining political disputes, as well as some that are escalating, pose a threat to stability. These disputes played out in the context of the January 31, 2009, provincial elections in fourteen of Iraqs eighteen provinces. The elections went ahead peacefully and produced a victory for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his allies, but also may have widened the split between Maliki and other erstwhile Shiite allies. The elections did not reduce tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Maliki over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas and local energy development. The progress in 2008 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Husseins regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraqs government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costswithout clear movement toward national political reconciliationstimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, there appears to be declining support in Congress for high levels of U.S. economic or security aid to Iraq. For further information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

Related Legislation:
• S.2196

Related Reports:
• RL31339
• RL31339

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