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Summary

The Obama Administration is facing a security environment in Iraq vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007, although still not completely peaceful or without potential to deteriorate significantly. The overall frequency of violence is down to levels not seen since 2003, yet insurgents are able to conduct high profile attacks. These attacks did not derail the June 30, 2009 U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from major cities and have not, to date, caused a modification of the February 27, 2009, announcement by President Obama that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010. This would leave a residual presence of 35,00050,000 U.S. trainers, advisers, and mentors, with these to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. This drawdown is in line with a U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, ratified by Iraqs parliament on November 27, 2008. Some U.S. officials believe that insurgents are waiting to take advantage of the U.S. drawdown and that a U.S. military presence might be needed beyond 2011 to ensure further political progress and produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. Others worry that some of the many remaining political disputes among Iraqi factions could escalate and reignite civil conflict; this concern was a theme of a three day visit to Iraq by Vice President Biden during the July 4 weekend. The political disputes were a factor in the political competition for January 31, 2009, provincial elections, and are continuing as Iraq heads toward the next national elections in January 2010. The provincial elections went ahead peacefully and produced a victory for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his allies, but also exposed splits between Maliki and other erstwhile Shiite allies. The elections also exacerbated tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Maliki over Kurdish demands for control of disputed areas. The security progress in 2008 and 2009 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Husseins regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraqs government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costswithout clear movement toward national political reconciliationstimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, U.S. economic and security aid to Iraq has been reduced since FY2008. For further information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

Related Legislation:
• S.2196

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