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• U.S. Department of State

Summary

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. This CRS Report discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since t he mid-1990s. A table s umm a r i z e s t h e U . S . s a n c t i o n s i m p o s e d o n P R C entities for weapons proliferation. This CRS Report will be updated as warranted. Since 1991, China has taken some steps to mollify concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported, China remains a "key supplier" of weapons technology -- particularly missile or chemical technology. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. On 8 occasions, the Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on PRC entities (not the government) for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to Pakistan and Iran, under the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, Iran Nonproliferation Act, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and Executive Order 12938. Among the actions, on September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions denying satellite exports (for 2 years), after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000 promise. During preparations for the U.S.-PRC summit in October 2002 at Crawford, TX, China, on August 25, 2002, published the missile export controls promised in November 2000. With questions about China's enforcement of the regulations and reductions in proliferation activities, President Bush has not waived the sanctions imposed in September 2001. Moreover, on May 23, June 26, and July 30, 2003, the Administration imposed sanctions on PRC entities for missile proliferation, signaling U.S. frustrations with China. China's cooperation is also sought on North Korea. The 107th Congress enacted the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-306) with Section 827 (inserted by Senator Thompson) to require the DCI to submit annual reports on PRC and other foreign companies that are involved in weapons proliferation and raise funds in U.S. capital markets. In the 108th Congress, the Senate's FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 1025, passed as H.R. 2417 on July 31, 2003) included Section 339(f) to repeal the above reporting requirement.

Related Legislation:
• S.1025
• H.R.2417

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