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• U.S. Department of State

Summary

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified reports to Congress by the intelligence community, China has been a "key supplier" of weapons technology, particularly missile or chemical technology. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, ongoing PRC proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. In contrast to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration repeatedly has imposed sanctions on PRC "entities" for troublesome transfers. On 19 occasions, the Administration has imposed sanctions on 32 different PRC "entities" (not the government) for transfers (related to missiles and chemical weapons) to Pakistan, Iran, or another country, including repeated sanctions on some "serial proliferators." Among those sanctions, in September 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports (for two years), after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000 promise. In September 2003, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial entity, effectively denying satellite exports to China. However, for six times, the State Department waived this sanction for the ban on imports of other PRC government products related to missiles, space systems, electronics, and military aircraft, and then issued a permanent waiver in March 2007. Skeptics question whether China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation has warranted President Bush's pursuit of closer bilateral ties. In this relationship, some observers say that President Bush has not forcefully pressed China's leaders on weapons nonproliferation as a priority issue, even while imposing numerous U.S. sanctions. Moreover, sanctions target "entities" but not the PRC government. China did not join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The 110th Congress passed H.R. 1 (P.L. 110-53) that included language to encourage China's participation in PSI. Since 2002, Bush has relied on China's "considerable influence" on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons, and Beijing has hosted the Six-Party Talks. China has pursued balanced positions on North Korea and Iran, but also evolved to vote for U.N. Security Council sanctions against nuclear proliferation.

Related Legislation:
• H.R.1

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