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Summary

In the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee case and the growing concern over the Department of Energy's (DOE) counterintelligence program that followed, DOE in March 1999 began developing its first-ever polygraph screening program affecting an estimated 800 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. Congress in October 1999 mandated DOE polygraph testing (P.L. 106-65, Sec. 3154) and expanded the program to cover 13,000 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. The following year, Congress further expanded polygraph testing to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees (P.L. 106-398, Sec. 3135) with the addition of new eligibility categories. In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. Congress directed DOE to institute a new polygraph program based upon the NAS findings (P.L. 107-107, Sec. 3152). NAS completed its study in October 2002, concluding that while polygraph testing is more effective when used in connection with event-specific investigations, its accuracy is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in screening current and prospective federal agency employees -- DOE's principal purpose in using the polygraph. According to NAS, in populations such as DOE's, where there is an extremely low level of major security violations, the polygraph has serious limitations for use in security screening to identify security risks. NAS also reported that there is a realistic possibility that the polygraph might be defeated with countermeasures. Although acknowledging the NAS findings, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced on April 14, 2003, that DOE would continue to use the polygraph for screening purposes, citing it as an effective component of DOE's counterintelligence program. He said that DOE does not use the polygraph on a stand-alone basis but as part of a larger fabric of investigative and analytical reviews to help security personnel determine if someone is suitable to access to classified data. He also asserted that polygraphs have value in deterring unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Pointing to the NAS findings, some Members of Congress have called on the Energy Secretary to review his decision, and have expressed a desire for a more focused polygraph program that would subject fewer DOE employees to testing. Others have cautioned that a false sense of confidence can arise from reliance on a technique they believe is inaccurate. They also cited NAS's warning that the polygraph can be defeated by countermeasures. There are several possible approaches Congress might assess, including retention of the status quo, the establishment of a more focused polygraph program under which those occupying only the most sensitive positions would be polygraphed; more research into alternatives to the polygraph; and the elimination of the polygraph for screening purposes altogether. This report will be updated as warranted.

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