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Summary

President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Irans strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessorin particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort has begun to be put in practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through a growing number of invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Irans nuclear program. The Administration also has de-emphasized policies that have angered Iranian leaders including: ratcheting up international sanctions, efforts to promote democracy in Iran, and the potential for U.S. military action. In May 2009, President Obama said his Administration might renew the previous focus on sanctioning and pressuring Iran if, by the end of 2009, Iran does not show signs of willingness to compromise. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline. Before Irans June 12, 2009, presidential elections, there was debate over whether the new approaches would yield clear results. The U.S. strategy has been further complicated by the allegations of a stolen election by the challengers to declared election winner, incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the large protests held to demand a new vote. Administration officials say that U.S. goals have not been altered by the election and President Obama, while criticizing Irans use of violence against protesters, has not announced any changes in policy toward Iran. Congress has passed resolutions that express solidarity with the demonstrators and condemn the regimes repression of them. The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administrations characterization of Iran as a profound threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated primarily by Irans nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The U.S. policy approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran primarily by applying progressive multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. Multilateral efforts to pressure Iran include three U.N. Security Council resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Irans nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, began to weaken Irans economy, compounding the effect of a sharp drop in oil prices since mid-2008. To emphasize its approach, the George W. Bush Administration maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. This report is updated regularly. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RS22323, Irans Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL34544, Irans Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.

Related Legislation:
• H.R.2194
• S.908
• S.2087
• S.2232

Related Reports:
• RL32045
• RL32045
• RL32045

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