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Summary

At a July 31, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Navy officials announced a major change in the service's position on what kind of destroyers it wants to procure over the next several years: The Navy officials testified that the service no longer wants to procure additional Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, and instead now wants to restart procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyers. Prior to changing its position, the Navy had wanted to continue procuring DDG1000s, and did not want to procure any more DDG-51s. Navy plans had called for procuring a total of seven DDG-1000s. The first two were procured in FY2007, and the Navy's proposed FY2009 budget, submitted to Congress in February 2008, requested funding for a third. The three DDG-51s procured in FY2005 were to have been the final ships in the DDG-51 program, and Navy budgets since FY2006 have included funding for closing out the DDG-51 program. Until the July 31 hearing, the Navy for several years had stressed the need for procuring additional DDG-1000s, defended the DDG-1000 program against various criticisms, and rejected proposals for stopping DDG-1000 procurement and for resuming procurement of DDG-51s. The issue for Congress is how to take the Navy's new position on destroyer procurement into account in marking up the Navy's proposed FY2009 budget. Although the Navy's proposed budget requests funding for procuring a third DDG1000, Navy officials suggested at the July 31 hearing that they would now prefer Congress to instead fund the procurement of a DDG-51 in FY2009. Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding the Navy's new position on destroyer procurement include the timing of the announcement of the new position, the availability of the analytical basis for the Navy's new position, the Navy's changed threat assessment, the Navy's selection of the DDG-51 as the ship best suited to meeting the new capability requirements resulting from the changed threat assessment, the Navy's description of the DDG-1000's anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities, and the industrial-base implications of stopping DDG-1000 procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement. Options for Congress include supporting the Navy's new position, which could involve, among other things, providing partial or full funding for the procurement of a DDG-51 in FY2009; rejecting the Navy's new position, which could involve, among other things, providing partial or full funding for the procurement of a DDG1000 in FY2009; and adopting an intermediate position, which could involve, among other things, providing partial or full funding for the procurement of either a DDG-51 or DDG-1000 destroyer in FY2009, with the choice to be made by the Navy. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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