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Summary

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced a global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. The desire to transform relations with India, according to Administration officials, is "founded upon a strategic vision that transcends even today's most pressing security concerns." President Bush said he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies." Administration officials have described the agreement as bringing India into the nonproliferation mainstream. For 30 years, India has remained outside the mainstream: it rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as discriminatory and exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974 that convinced the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. Nonproliferation experts have suggested that potential costs to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy of bringing India into the nonproliferation mainstream in this manner may far exceed the benefits. For example, at a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a Nuclear Suppliers Group exception. It would reverse nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice towards India. Some believe this agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. India does not meet nonproliferation criteria for nuclear cooperation under current U.S. law (Atomic Energy Act; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. 2153 et seq.). If the Administration were to comply with current law, the first step would be to seek a joint resolution of approval from the Congress on the text of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Additional waivers and determinations would also be necessary. The Administration reportedly prefers to create an exception for India to existing provisions of law through stand-alone legislation. A prerequisite for proposing such legislation, according to Bush Administration officials, has been progress on India's plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, a key nonproliferation commitment under the Joint Statement. Following the agreement of U.S. and Indian officials on March 2, 2006 on India's separation plan, the Bush Administration may be ready to propose such legislation to create an exception for India to current restrictions barring nuclear cooperation (See CRS Report RL33292, India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, by Sharon Squassoni). This report will be updated as necessary.

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