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Summary

The Department of Defenses (DODs) FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007 budgets proposed to cancel the F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a program that was initiated by Congress in the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act, and which has received consistent congressional support since its inception. Congress rejected these proposals, and added funding for the F136 to DODs budget request each year. In FY1996, defense authorization conferees (H.Rept. 104-450, Sec. 213) expressed their concern over a lack of engine competition in the JSF program and directed DOD to ensure that the program provides for adequate engine competition (p. 706). (At that time, the JSF program was The Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program, called JAST.) In FY1998, authorization conferees (H.Rept. 105-340, Sec. 213) directed DOD to certify that the Joint Strike Fighter Program contains sufficient funding to carry out an alternate engine development program that includes flight qualification of an alternate engine in a joint strike fighter airframe (p. 33). Since its inception in 1997, Congress has provided approximately $2.5 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine program. The alternate engine program is expected to need an additional $900 million through 2013 to complete the development of the F136 engine. Some have criticized DOD and the Air Force for being short-sighted with its proposal to terminate the F136 alternate engine. Critics of the decision, not to mention OSD and the Air Force itself during testimony before Congress, note that it was driven more by immediate budget pressures on the department rather than long term pros and cons of the F136 engine program. Others applaud this decision, and say that single source engine production contracts have been the norm, not the exception. Long-term engine affordability, they claim, is best achieved by procuring engines through multiyear contracts from a single source. Cancelling the F-136 engine poses questions on operational risk and potential cost and savings. Additional issues include the potential impact this termination might have on the U.S. defense industrial base, and on U.S. relations with key allied countries. Finally, eliminating competitive market forces for DOD business worth billions of dollars may concern those who wish to change DODs acquisition system and achieve what they see as higher standards of accountability. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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