Download Locations

• Open CRS (User submitted)

Summary

Since August 2003, negotiations over North Koreas nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weapons-grade plutonium estimated as sufficient for five to eight atomic weapons. North Korea tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched uranium program, which also could produce atomic weapons. There also is substantial information that North Korea has engaged in collaborative programs with Iran and Syria aimed at producing nuclear weapons. On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test. On April 14, 2009, North Korea terminated its participation in six party talks and said it would not be bound by agreements between it and the Bush Administration, ratified by the six parties, which would have disabled the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea also announced that it would reverse the ongoing disablement process under these agreements and restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading to North Koreas announcement: the failure to complete implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreement, including the Yongbyon disablement, because of a dispute over whether inspectors could take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon; the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008, which reportedly brought forth a collective leadership including a more pronounced role for the North Korean military; and the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a tough set of negotiating positions, including an assertion that the United States must extend normal diplomatic relations prior to any final denuclearization agreement rather than in such an agreement; and that U.S. reciprocity for North Korean denuclearization must be an end of the U.S. nuclear threat, meaning major reductions of and restrictions on U.S. military forces in and around the Korean peninsula. North Koreas announcement presents the Obama Administration with two apparent challenges. One is how to restore a negotiating track with North Korea. The Administration appears to face a choice between seeking to bring North Korea back into the six party framework or offering North Korea strictly bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Responding to North Koreas tough negotiating positions would be a second challenge. Would the Administrations goal in the next stage of negotiations be the complete dismantlement of Yongbyon, or would it focus on the elimination of North Koreas nuclear weapons and plutonium? North Koreas assertion of diplomatic normalization prior to denuclearization contradicts the longstanding U.S. position that the two would be reciprocal. North Koreas likely demand for light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) as part of a future nuclear agreement would confront the Obama Administration with a decision whether to enter into a second LWR project that could consume ten years or more (the first project began in 1994 under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and collapsed in 2002). Pyongyangs demand that a denuclearization agreement include an end to the U.S. nuclear threat directly challenges the position of several U.S. administrations that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea over the status of U.S. military forces in South Korea. Finally, any attempt by the Obama Administration to bring North Koreas highly enriched uranium and proliferation activities with Iran and Syria into negotiations would reverse the decision of the Bush Administration that North Korea did not have to admit to these activities in the Bush Administration-North Korean agreements. This report will be updated periodically.

XML