Download Locations

• Open CRS (User submitted)

Summary

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence, but sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting have not been fully resolved. Some believe that Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki, strengthened politically by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, is increasingly authoritarian, in part to ensure that he holds power after the planned January 16, 2010, national elections. Maliki is widely assessed as gaining control of the security services and building new security organs loyal to him personally. He has also formed cross-sectarian alliances with a wide range of Sunni and Kurdish factions, to counter a new coalition formed in late August by his erstwhile Shiite allies. Perhaps because of the approaching elections, Maliki has not been able to forge national consensus on key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as national hydrocarbon laws. Based partly on the relative absence of violence surrounding the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, in February 2009 the Obama Administration announced and has begun implementing a reduction of the U.S. troop presence to about 35,000Œ50,000 U.S. forces by August 2010. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, and which President Obama has said would be followed, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. The Obama Administration asserts that, despite a recent spike in high-profile attacks, particularly in the north, overall violence remains relatively low, and the U.S. drawdown schedule has not been altered. Fueling the optimism is the observation that the recent attacks have not reignited large-scale sectarian violence. Still, nervous that U.S. gains in 2008 and 2009 could be jeopardized if all-out sectarian conflict returns, recent U.S. official visits to Iraq have stressed to Maliki the need for further compromises with the Kurds and with still-disgruntled Sunni leaders to promote genuine political reconciliation. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

XML