Open CRS: Recent Reports

Greeenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce

Wed, 17 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, was introduced May 15, 2009, by Representatives Waxman and Markey, and was subsequently modified (both technical and substantive changes) and ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 21, 2009. The bill was reported (amended) June 5 (H.Rept. 111-137, Part I). Among the major provisions of the bill are the following: H.R. 2454 contains provisions that would amend the Clean Air Act to establish a cap-and-trade system designed to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. The market-based approach would establish an absolute cap on the emissions and would allow trading of emissions permits (“allowances”). The bill achieves its broad coverage through an upstream compliance mandate on petroleum and most fluorinated gas producers and importers, and a downstream mandate on electric generators, industrial sources, and natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs). The bill allocates a substantial percentage of the allowances for the benefit of energy consumers and low-income households. As the program proceeds through the mid-2020s it shifts to more government auctioning with most of the proceeds returned to households. The bill’s allocation scheme includes free allowance allocations to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, merchant coal-fired electric generators, and petroleum refiners. An important cost control mechanism in the cap-and-trade program is the availability of domestic and international offsets. The bill contains energy efficiency provisions that cover grants, standards, rebates and other programs for buildings, lighting and commercial equipment, water-using equipment, wood stoves, industrial equipment, and healthcare facilities. H.R. 2454 contains several provisions related to vehicles and fuels, including incentives to produce plug-in vehicles and other advanced technology vehicles. Three percent of allowances from the greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program would be allocated to the automotive sector to provide grants to refit or establish plants to build plug-ins and other advanced vehicles. The bill would also establish a “cash-for-clunkers” program, providing new vehicle purchasers and lessees with vouchers worth up to $4,500 for a new, more efficient vehicle to replace an older, less efficient vehicle, and directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish greenhouse gas emissions standards for various transportation sectors. The bill requires EPA to develop a unified national strategy for addressing the key legal and regulatory barriers to deployment of commercial scale carbon capture and sequestration. The legislation would amend the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) to create an integrated energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard starting in 2011, requiring retail electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their electricity demand through renewable energy sources and energy efficiency by 2020. The bill provides for smart grid technologies, including products that can be equipped with smart grid capability, requirements for electric power retailers to reduce their peak loads using smart grid and other energy efficient technologies, and requirements that power suppliers ensure that utility smart grid systems will be compatible with plug-in electric drive vehicles.

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft

Wed, 10 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter and flies like a plane by tilting its wing-mounted rotors to function as propellers. Combining a helicopter's operational flexibility with the greater speed, range, and efficiency of fixed-wing aircraft, the V-22 can perform such missions as troop/cargo transport, amphibious assault, special operations, and search and rescue operations. Begun in FY1982 by the Army and now funded in part by the Air Force, the V-22 has been primarily a Marine Corps program funded by the Navy Department. The aircraft is produced by Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters, with engines produced by Rolls-Royce/Allison. Flight testing and operational evaluation of pre-production V-22s began in early 1997, with procurement of production aircraft approved in April 1997. The future of the aircraft was at issue in 1989-92, when Secretary of Defense Cheney sought to cancel the program on grounds of affordability. Congress continued to fund the program, however, providing $16.4 billion through FY2004. As of June 30, 2004, the Defense Department estimated the program's total cost to be about $48 billion to develop and produce 458 aircraft. The Administration's FY2002 defense budget requested $3,278.3 million for the V-22 program. This included procurement of 12 MV-22s for the Marine Corps, modification of existing aircraft, and RDT&E. Appropriations conferees reduced the Navy procurement ($226 million and three airframes) and RDT&E. Air Force procurement was also cut, but R&D was increased ($180 million) to buy three EMD airframes. The Department of Defense included $1.9 billion in V-22 funding in its FY2003 budget request. The Department of Defense procured 11 MV-22 aircraft in FY2003, the minimum annual purchase required to keep the assembly lines intact. The Bush Administration's FY2004 budget requested $1.6 billion in overall V-22 funding, $1.1 billion to procure 11 aircraft (nine for the Marine Corps, 2 for the Air Force), and $543.9 million in R&D funding. This request was matched by appropriators, with a transfer of some R&D funding to the Special Operations Command. The Administration's FY2005 request included $1.6 billion in procurement and RDT&E funding for the V-22. Appropriations conferees cut $38 million from the Navy's RDT&E request, but otherwise approved all V-22 funding for FY2005. Congress has supported the V-22 as a new technology with multi-service military applications as well as various civilian uses (if derivatives of this tilt-rotor aircraft are developed for civil aviation) with potential commercial and foreign sales implications. Critics of the V-22 have questioned its affordability and argued that its performance would not justify the cost of procuring this new aircraft in the quantity projected. Also, in light of several accidents, and a reported cover-up, critics argue that the tilt-rotor technology is too risky, while supporters contend that risks are being adequately addressed under a revamped program. This report will be updated.

VXX Presidential Helicopter: Background and Issues for Congress

Tue, 09 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

On January 28, 2005, Navy officials announced the award of the VXX helicopter contract to Lockheed Martin Corp. Critics of the award have raised concerns about the effect on the U.S. defense industrial base, U.S. trade, and whether Buy American statutes apply. Some question whether the competition was fair. Legislation has been introduced regarding some of these issues. This report will be updated as warranted.

The Role of the Department of Defense During A Flu Pandemic

Thu, 04 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

A flu pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of an influenza virus. As such, the United States response to a flu pandemic would have both international and domestic components. Additionally, the domestic response effort would include contributions from every governmental level (local, state, tribal, and federal), non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. This report will focus largely on the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in supporting the nations domestic response effort, although it will also touch on DODs international role. The Department of State would lead the federal governments international response efforts, while the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services would lead the federal governments domestic response. The Department of Defense would likely be called upon to support both the international and domestic efforts. An analysis of the tasks assigned by the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan indicates that DODs role during a flu pandemic would center on the following objectives: assisting in disease surveillance; assisting partner nations, particularly through military-to-military assistance; protecting and treating US forces and dependents; and providing support to civil authorities in the United States With respect to providing support to civil authorities in the United States, the types of defense support which would likely be in greatest demand during a flu pandemic include: providing disease surveillance and laboratory diagnostics; transporting response teams, vaccines, medical equipment, supplies, diagnostic devices, pharmaceuticals and blood products; treating patients; evacuating the ill and injured; processing and tracking patients; providing base and installation support to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies; controlling movement into and out of areas, or across borders, with affected populations; supporting law enforcement; supporting quarantine enforcement; restoring damaged public utilities; and providing mortuary services. Note, however, that DODs ability to support these requests would be limited by its national defense and force protection responsibilities. The two principal ways in which defense support could be provided to civil authorities are by way of an immediate response, or in response to a formal request for assistance (RFA). Additionally, in extreme circumstances the federal government may expedite or suspend the RFA process and initiate a proactive federal response. National Guard personnel would almost certainly be involved in domestic response efforts as members of their state militia under the control of their governor. Current DOD plans do not anticipate federal mobilization of the National Guard or Reserves to respond to a flu pandemic. However, these plans could be modified if circumstances warranted it (for example, if the severity of the pandemic significantly exceeded DODs planning assumptions). In the event such a federal mobilization is contemplated, an important consideration would be the impact it would have on any response efforts that were already occurring at the state and local levels. For example, the activation of Reserve and National Guard medical personnel may pull them out of local hospitals where they are already engaged in the response effort, thereby undermining state and local response efforts.

Military Installation Real Property and Services: Proposed Legislation in the 111th Congress

Thu, 04 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Several bills (S. 590, H.R. 1959, and H.R. 2295) that would modify or expand statutory authorities granted to senior executives of the Department of Defense (DOD) have been introduced to the 111th Congress. These authorities relate to the exchange of real property, the outsourcing of some military installation support services, and the reimbursement by DOD of some costs associated with military site cleanup. The proposed legislation would also amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the BRAC law, to expand existing legal protections granted to those who have taken title to property at closed military bases and to set conditions under which future title transfers for surplus military property would be carried out at no cost to the recipient. S. 590 and H.R. 2295 are identical. If enacted, these bills would render permanent an expired authority held by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of a military department) to exchange any defense real property for real property held by non-DOD entities if the exchange will limit encroachment on military activities or will relieve a shortage of military housing. They would also expand and make permanent a limited pilot program that allows certain services currently performed at military installations by DOD employees or private contractors to be non-competitively outsourced to municipal or county governments. Another section in the bills would expand the authority of the Secretary of Defense to enter into a cost-reimbursement agreement for the cleanup of a military site. Current law permits agreements that reimburse federal, state, and local agencies and other entities for certain costs incurred by participation in a cleanup program. The bill would allow reimbursement agreements to include costs incurred in the processing of a transfer of title of federal property and would prevent the Secretary from imposing certain conditions on the funding made available. The remaining sections of the bills would amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the so-called BRAC law. They would expand the legal protections available to persons who have taken title to property on closed military bases and would require the conveyance of surplus military property at no cost if certain conditions are met. This report analyzes the key provisions of the legislation, identifies probable effects of the proposed amendments to existing law, and suggests issues raised for congressional consideration.

Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress

Thu, 04 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Navy in FY2006 and future years wants to procure no more Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers and instead wants to begin procuring two new classes of surface combatants -- a new destroyer called the DD(X), and a smaller surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In support of this plan, the Navy for FY2005 requested procurement funding for three final DDG-51s and initial procurement funding for the first DD(X) and the first LCS. Congress for FY2005 provided $3,445.0 million for procurement of three DDG51s. Congress also provided $350.5 million in advance procurement funding for the DD(X) program -- $221.1 million for the first DD(X), and $84.4 million for the second DD(X) -- and directed that procurement of DD(X)s be fully funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than incrementally funded in the Navy's research and development account as the Navy had proposed for the first DD(X). Congress approved the Navy's plan to build the first LCS using research and development funds rather than shipbuilding funds, provided $214.7 million in procurement funding to fund the ship's entire construction cost (rather than about half the ship's cost, as the Navy had requested), required the next LCS (to be funded in FY2006) to be built to a second LCS design now being developed, prohibited the Navy from requesting funds in FY2006 to build a third LCS, and required all LCSs built after the lead ships of each design to be funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than its research and development account. As part of the proposed FY2006 defense budget to be submitted to Congress in early February 2005, the Navy is expected to request additional advance procurement funding for the first DD(X) and procurement funding for the second LCS. The DD(X) and LCS programs raise several oversight issues for Congress. Potential options for Congress for the DD(X) program include approving the program as proposed by the Navy and supplementing the industrial base, if needed, with additional work; accelerating procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2006 and the second DD(X) to FY2007; deferring procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2008; procuring two or more DD(X)s per year; building DD(X)s at a single yard, or building each DD(X) jointly at two yards; terminating the DD(X) program now, or after procuring a single ship as a technology demonstrator, and supplementing the industrial base with additional work until the start of CG(X) cruiser procurement, and starting design work now on a smaller, less expensive alternative to the DD(X) and procuring this new design, rather than DD(X)s or CG(X)s, starting around FY2011. Options for Congress on the LCS program include shifting procurement funding for LCS mission modules to the Navy's ship-procurement account; procuring a few LCSs and then evaluating them before deciding whether to put the LCS into larger-scale series production; procuring LCSs at a rate of up to 10 per year; procuring LCSs at a rate of less than 5 per year; terminating the LCS program and instead procuring a new-design frigate; and terminating the LCS program and investing more in other littoral-warfare improvements.

Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) -- Background and Issues for Congress

Thu, 04 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Navy is taking several actions to expand its capabilities for participating in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Navy's role in the GWOT raises several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the need for an increased Navy role, and amount of Navy personnel and funding associated with GWOT-related activities. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments

Wed, 03 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Limitations on nuclear testing have been on the international agenda since 1954. The United States ratified one such treaty in 1963 and two in 1990 that together bar all but underground nuclear tests with an explosive yield of 150 kilotons or less. The United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992. In 1996, this nation signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. The Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999. That debate focused on such pros and cons as whether the United States could maintain its nuclear weapons without testing, whether it could verify compliance with the treaty, and how the treaty would affect nuclear nonproliferation. Another aspect to past debates was Safeguards, measures that this nation can take unilaterally within the treaty to protect its nuclear security. To compensate for disadvantages and risk they saw in the treaty regime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for the 1963 treaty on four Safeguards: an aggressive nuclear test program, maintaining nuclear weapon laboratories, maintaining the ability to resume atmospheric tests promptly, and improving intelligence and nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities. Safeguards were key to securing Senate ratification of the 1963 treaty. Updated Safeguards have been part of subsequent treaty ratification efforts. In April 2009, President Obama pledged to pursue U.S. CTBT ratification immediately and aggressively. A debate on the treaty would involve its pros and cons and how they have changed since 1999. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, examines such issues, but no prior CRS report examined the role of Safeguards in a future debate. Like pros and cons, Safeguards could affect Senators net assessment of the treaty; unlike pros and cons, they are amenable to legislative bargaining and compromise. As such, they may play a key role in a CTBT debate. To that end, Safeguards could be updated, such as by adding Safeguards for the nuclear weapon production plants and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures. While Safeguards may be part of a future CTBT debate, both supporters and opponents of the treaty could criticize them. Supporters may see augmented Safeguards as unneeded, arguing that the technical case for the treaty is stronger than in 1999. Many supporters favor further reductions and, ultimately, elimination of nuclear weapons, and view the CTBT as a stepping-stone in that direction; they could see revised Safeguards as moving in the opposite direction by supporting U.S. nuclear capabilities. Opponents assert that this nation cannot have confidence in its nuclear weapons or the program to maintain them without testing, and that nations could conceal nuclear tests. They hold that the United States has not adequately implemented existing Safeguards, and doubt it would do better with CTBT Safeguards. In their view, both the CTBT and inadequately-supported Safeguards would jeopardize U.S. security. This report may be updated occasionally.

Costa Rica: Background and U.S. Relations

Tue, 02 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Costa Rica is a relatively politically stable and economically developed nation with a long tradition of civilian democracy. Former president (1986-1990) and Nobel-laureate Oscar Arias of the National Liberation Party was elected President in 2006. Throughout his term, Arias has focused on expanding the countrys social safety net and increasing free trade. He faced strong opposition to the countrys inclusion in the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), but eventually secured its ratification and implementation. Arias has also been active in foreign affairs, establishing diplomatic relations with China and Cuba after decades without formal ties. Once a predominantly agricultural nation, Costa Rica has established a diversified economy with a strong export sector. Under President Arias, the country has increased its social investment, experienced significant economic growth, and seen a reduction in poverty. The global financial crisis and economic downturn, however, threatens to erase these gains. President Arias has responded to the crisis with an ambitious fiscal stimulus and social protection plan. While the plan may do much to mitigate the social impacts of the crisis, analysts believe it will be unable to prevent Costa Ricas economy from slowing considerably in 2009. In recent years, many have begun to recognize Costa Rica as a world leader in environmental protection. Successive Costa Rican administrations have sought to address the extensive deforestation and environmental degradation that resulted from decades of logging and agricultural expansion. The countrys innovative policies, strong conservation system, and commitment to alternative energy have done much to restore Costa Ricas environment. Costa Rica is also party to a variety of international treaties and has committed to becoming carbon neutral by 2021. This commitment to environmental protection has been a significant source of economic growth for the country as Costa Rica is now a top destination for ecotourism. The United States and Costa Rica have long enjoyed close relations as a result of the countries shared commitments to strengthening democracy, improving human rights, and advancing free trade. The countries have also maintained strong commercial ties, which are likely to become even more extensive as a result of the implementation of CAFTA-DR. Costa Rica and the United States have worked together on a number of other issues as well, such as conserving Costa Ricas tropical forests and combating narcotics trafficking. For additional information see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck, CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke, and CRS Report R40135, Mrida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.

Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States

Tue, 02 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing rights or the application of a host countrys laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty (i.e., as an executive agreement or a nonlegal political commitment). Occasionally, the substance and form of a proposed security agreement may become a source of dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In November 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, and contemplated a long-term presence by U.S. forces in Iraq. This announcement became a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern appeared to dissipate when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in an agreement that did not contain a long-term, legally binding security commitment by the United States, but instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. It is likely that future disputes will arise between the political branches regarding the entering or implementation of international security agreements. Regardless of the form a security arrangement may take, Congress has several tools to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background on the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Iraq. The report discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. For more information regarding the U.S.-Iraq security agreements, see CRS Report R40011, U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight, by R. Chuck Mason, and CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Agreements: Congressional Oversight Activities and Legislative Response, by Matthew C. Weed.

Access to Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality Debate

Mon, 01 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as net neutrality. There is no single accepted definition of net neutrality. However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Concern over whether it is necessary for policymakers to take steps to ensure access to the Internet for content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and if so, what these steps should be, is a major focus in the debate over telecommunications reform. Some policymakers contend that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that additional regulations would have negative effects on the expansion and future development of the Internet. Although most concede that networks have and will always need some management, the use of prioritization tools, such as deep packet inspection, as well as the initiation of metered/consumption-based billing practices have further fueled the debate. A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and the 111th Congress, to date, has not introduced stand-alone legislation to address this issue. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Provisions require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish ... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). It is anticipated that the NTIA will release these rules by summer 2009. The ARRA also requires the FCC to submit a report, containing a national broadband plan, to both the House and Senate Commerce Committees by February 2010. The FCC adopted, on April 8, 2009, a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to seek input from stakeholders as it begins to develop this plan. Included among the issues under discussion in the NOI is the question of the role of open networks. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Hiring and Pay Authorities for Federal Scientific and Technical (S&T) Personnel

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In recent decades, the federal government has made many efforts to recruit and retain scientists, engineers, and technical workers, who otherwise may find a more attractive environment in the private and nonfederal sectors. As a group, these science and technology (S&T) personnel may be called the federal S&T workforce. A large subset of the S&T workforce is composed of scientific and engineering (S&E) personnel. By one count, the federal government employs over 200,000 scientists and engineers. Several factors have contributed to concerns about the federal S&T workforce. These include demand for S&T workers, concerns as to whether federal salaries are competitive with the private sector, the need for U.S. citizenship for federal employment, and the aging of the federal S&T workforce as those hired during previous federal S&T hiring booms retire. Many federal S&T personnel are hired or paid under agency-specific statutory authorities, rather than government-wide civil service laws in Title 5 of the United States Code. Others may be hired or paid under a variety of executive-branch-wide statutory authorities which allow for, among other things, demonstration projects, direct hiring, and special pay rates. Congress frequently has been willing to grant flexibility for expedited hiring or higher-than-usual rates of pay, in order to better equip agencies to accomplish congressionally determined public policy objectives. However, Congress frequently also has been wary of providing too much flexibility, or unaccountable flexibility, because of the potential for flexibility to be abused. Therefore, federal personnel-related laws continually raise the issue of how to balance flexibility, on one hand, with preventing abuse of the flexibility, on the other. Human resource management issues relating to S&T personnel have been of ongoing concern to Congress, both government-wide and for particular agencies. Because hiring and pay practices are changing constantly, not only by law, but also by agency regulation and administrative action, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview or assessment of all policies here. Nevertheless, if Congress wishes to evaluate the ability of the federal government and its agencies to recruit and retain S&T personnel, the variety of statutory authorities provide illustrations of topics that might be examined. In addition, the federal governments experience with these statutory authorities might inform Congresss deliberations. For example, Congress may wish to consider modifying the ability of the federal government to recruit highly-qualified scientific, engineering, and technical personnel. In evaluating current efforts or considering future modifications, Congress may wish to consider options that include agency-specific or executive-branch-wide approaches; leveraging the involvement of the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the federal Chief Human Capital Officers Council, or other entities; requiring agencies to engage in strategic planning, evaluation, or other activities; and exploring a variety of S&T personnel issues in specific agency and policy contexts. This report will be updated when events warrant.

Airport Improvement Program (AIP): Reauthorization Issues for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Airport Improvement Program (AIP): Reauthorization Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service Summary The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) has been providing federal grants for airport development and planning since the passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). AIP funding is usually spent on projects that support aircraft operations such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety or emergency equipment. The funds obligated for the AIP are drawn from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (hereafter referred to as the trust fund), which is supported by a variety of user fees and fuel taxes. The AIP is one of five major sources of airport capital development funding. The other sources are tax-exempt bonds, passenger facility charges (PFCs: a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and airport operating revenue. Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airports financial situation and the type of project being considered. Small airports are more dependent on AIP grants than large or medium-sized airports. The larger airports, whose projects tend to be much more costly, are more likely to participate in the tax-exempt bond market or finance capital development projects with a PFC. The multi-year authorization of the AIP under Vision 100Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) ended on September 30, 2007. Since then, a series of short-term extensions has authorized and provided funding for AIP, most recently through September 30, 2009 (P.L. 111-12). The AIP and PFC issues that have been considered during the ongoing debate regarding the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) include the national level of need for airport development and the appropriate AIP funding level; the appropriate federal role in airport development; the criteria for the distribution of funding across airports of different types and sizes; the sufficiency of AIP discretionary funding, especially for major capacity enhancing projects; airport privatization; defederalization of large airports; raising or eliminating the $4.50 ceiling now imposed on PFCs; the use and tax treatment of airport bonds; and noise mitigation funding and eligibility. During the FAA reauthorization debate, virtually all of the policy issues and options concerning AIP will be influenced by the broader budget issues of the adequacy of trust fund revenues and the availability of money for the FAA from the Treasury general fund. Should ample revenues be available, the reauthorization of AIP could maintain the programs structure and perhaps even increase AIP spending. A constrained-budget scenario would probably increase interest in such issues as defederalization or a tightening of program formula funding and eligibility criteria, which could provide cost savings. It could also increase interest in raising or eliminating the PFC ceiling, which could help airports fund more projects. This report is focused solely on AIP issues in the ongoing FAA reauthorization debate. To track the full FAA reauthorization debate, including legislative action on AIP and other FAA programs and activities, see CRS Report R40410, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization: An Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress, coordinated by Bart Elias.

Military Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's highest priority aviation modernization program. It is replacing Navy F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18C/D Hornet combat aircraft. The decision to undertake F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was made during a period of great turbulence in Navy aviation modernization. During this time frame the Navy struggled to identify and implement the best way to modernize its aging fleet of F-14 fighters and A-6E attack aircraft. The A-12 program (a stealthy replacement to the A-6E) was terminated in January 1991. The AFX program, another proposed replacement for the A-6E, began in 1991, but was also terminated. The principal alternative to the F/A-18E/F was a modest upgrade of the F-14 -- a large, two-seat fighter designed in the 1960s, with potential air-to-surface attack capabilities. Some observers describe the F/A-18E/F as an upgraded and larger version of the F/A-18C/D, with increased range and payload capacity and more space and weight for future improvements. Others assert that the differences between the baseline Hornet aircraft and the E/F model are so great that they would describe the Super Hornet as an entirely new aircraft. The Department of Defense is currently facing a shortage of radar and communications jamming capability. The Navy and Marine Corp's EA-6B Prowlers escort and protect Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force aircraft operating in hostile airspace. The Prowlers, however, are few and rapidly aging.1 All the Services are evaluating preferred approaches to ameliorating this shortfall. The Navy's preferred approach is to produce a new electronic attack aircraft based on the F/A-18F, called the EA-18G. The Defense Department's Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) of December 31, 2004, estimated the acquisition cost of a 462-aircraft program at $43.98 billion. The cost of procuring 90 EA-18G electronic attack variants is estimated at $8.65 billion. The Super Hornet has been approved for international export, but no sales have been made as of July 2005. Key issues surrounding the program include how many Super Hornets should ultimately be procured, and management of the E/F multi-year procurement contract, and the commonality between the F and G variants.

The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army's multiyear, multibillion- dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It is to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program to consist of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat systems. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high- risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended.

The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly influence the program's progress. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, proposed and possible defense budget cuts, and the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will each likely play a role in shaping the FCS program. The revised FCS program timeline — including four "spirals" whereby equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into the current force — has extended the program's timeline by four years and has added additional funding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk associated with this admittedly high-risk venture.

The overall FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program's inception and because the program is still in its early stages, its full costs are not yet known. The FCS program is managed by a lead systems integrator group consisting of major defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Although widely criticized, the Army adopted this program management approach largely because it did not have enough acquisition, scientific, and engineering staff to manage a program of this complexity and scope. In addition the program's use of an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement in lieu of a more structured Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract raised a number of concerns regarding program oversight and protecting the taxpayer's interests. Partly due to Congressional pressure, the Army recently decided to change from an OTA to a more traditional contract, although specific details at this point are few.

The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues in its Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program as well as in the manned and unmanned ground vehicle programs. Congress, in its authorization, appropriation, and oversight roles may wish to review the relevancy of the FCS program in terms of current and potential future threats, the overall viability of the program, program management and contractual agreements, and program "off ramps" into the current force should the FCS program be modified or curtailed. This report will be updated as the situation warrants.

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities -- Background and Issues for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China's military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China's military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China's military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly highpower microwave (HPM) devices. China's naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term focus of China's military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China's naval modernization include asserting China's regional military leadership and protecting China's maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests. China's naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China's maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons. Certain options are available for improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010; additional options, particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities in subsequent years. China's naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet's share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) program, or Deepwater program for short, is a $24-billion, 25-year project to replace and modernize the Coast Guard's aging fleet of deepwater-capable ships and aircraft. It is the largest and most complex acquisition effort in Coast Guard history, encompassing 91 new cutters, 124 new small surface craft, and 244 new or converted airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration's annual funding requests and overall approach for the program. The Coast Guard is pursuing the Deepwater program as a system-of-systems acquisition project, under which a combination of cutters, patrol boats, aircraft, and supporting assets is to be procured as a single, integrated package. To execute this system-of-systems acquisition approach, the Coast Guard is using a lead system integrator (LSI) -- a private-sector entity responsible for designing, building, and integrating the various elements of the package. On June 25, 2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater LSI role to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) -- an industry team led by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems division. ICGS was awarded a contract that includes a five-year baseline term and five potential additional award terms of up to five years (60 months) each. On May 19, 2006, the Coast Guard announced that it was awarding ICGS a 43-month first additional award term. Some observers have strongly criticized the management and execution of the Deepwater program, particularly regarding the decision to use an LSI, the execution of a project for modernizing 49 Island-class 110-foot patrol boats and keeping them service until they are replaced by the 58 planned Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and the FRC design effort. The Coast Guard and industry have acknowledged problems but defended their management and execution of the Deepwater program. Potential options for Congress regarding the Deepwater program include but are not limited to the following: continuing with the program as currently planned; instituting additional or stricter reporting requirements; compressing the acquisition period from 25 years to 15 or 10 years; replacing ICGS as the LSI; dropping the use of an LSI in favor of direct Coast Guard management and integration of the program; and replacing the Deepwater program with a series of separate procurement programs for replacing individual classes of cutters, boats, and aircraft. The Coast Guard's FY2007 budget requested $934.431 million for the Deepwater program. The conference report (H.Rept. 109-699 of September 28, 2006) on H.R. 5441/P.L. 109-295, the FY2007 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations act, provides a total $1,144.566 million in FY2007 funds for the Deepwater program. H.R. 889/P.L. 109-241, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, establishes certain reporting requirements for the Deepwater program. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use of nuclear power to a wider array of Navy surface ships, especially the Navy's planned CG(X) cruiser. The Navy wants to procure the first CG(X) in FY2011, and is currently studying design options for the ship, including the use of nuclear power. A 2006 Navy study concluded the following, among other things: ! In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost. ! The total life-cycle cost of a medium-size nuclear-powered surface combatant would equal that of a conventionally powered mediumsize surface combatant if the cost of crude oil averages $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel over the life of the ship. ! Nuclear-power should be considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants. ! Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and in terms of operational presence (time on station) in the theater of operation. In assessing whether the CG(X) or other future Navy surface ships should be nuclear-powered, Congress may consider a number of issues, including cost, operational effectiveness, ship construction, ship maintenance and repair, crew training, ports calls and forward homeporting, and environmental impact. Potential options for Congress include but are not limited to the following: ! for the CG(X) or other future Navy surface ships, direct the Navy to provide Congress with acquisition plans (including annual funding requirements) for both conventionally powered and nuclear-powered versions, so that Congress can assess both plans; ! direct the Navy to fund the procurement of initial fuel cores for nuclear-powered ships through an appropriation account other than the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account; ! direct the Navy to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship; ! pass permanent legislation, perhaps similar to the so-called Title VIII legislation of the 1970s, requiring future Navy ships of certain kinds to be nuclear-powered; ! provide initial research and development funding to start work on adapting the design of the Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier nuclear power plant for use in the CG(X); and ! direct the Navy to study the option of, or begin the process of, certifying Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and/or General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works to build nuclear-powered ships. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Of the Coast Guard's three polar icebreakers, two -- Polar Star and Polar Sea -- have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Star is not operational and has been caretaker status since July 1, 2006. The Coast Guard has begun initial studies on replacements for the two ships. Under the Coast Guard's current schedule, the first replacement ship might enter service in 8 to 10 years. A 2007 report from the National Research Council (NRC) on the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet states that "U.S. [polar] icebreaking capability is now at risk of being unable to support national interests in the north and the south." Congress, in the explanatory statement for the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161 of December 26, 2007), expressed concern about the Coast Guard's ability to meet its polar operations mission requirements and directed the Coast Guard to submit a comprehensive report on the issue. The Coast Guard estimates that new replacement ships might cost $800 million to $925 million each in 2008 dollars, and that the alternative of extending the service lives of Polar Sea and Polar Star for 25 years might cost about $400 million per ship. Potential policy issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization include the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast Guard will need in the future; whether to provide these icebreakers through construction of new ships or service life extensions of older ships; whether to accelerate the Coast Guard's current schedule for acquiring replacement ships; whether new ships should be nuclear powered; whether new ships should be funded in the Coast Guard budget or the Department of Defense (DOD) budget; and whether, as an interim measure, the Polar Star should be repaired and placed back into service. Congress's options regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization include but are not limited to the following: approving the Coast Guard's current plan; holding hearings to solicit additional information on the issue; directing the Coast Guard to include the option of nuclear power in its studies of requirements for future icebreakers; directing the Coast Guard to pursue a particular acquisition strategy for icebreaker modernization; accelerating the procurement of new icebreakers relative to the Coast Guard's current plan; funding the procurement of new icebreakers in the DOD budget rather than the Coast Guard budget; and directing the Coast Guard to reactivate Polar Star. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Background and Issues

Fri, 29 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Members of the military and U.S. citizens who live abroad are eligible to register and vote absentee in federal elections under the provisions of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 1986. The law was enacted to improve absentee registration and voting for this group of voters and to consolidate existing laws. Since 1942, several federal laws have been enacted to assist these voters: the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (amended in 1944), the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 (both the 1955 and 1975 laws were amended in 1978 to improve procedures), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986. The law is administered by the Secretary of Defense, who delegates that responsibility to the Director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program at the Department of Defense (DoD). The closeness of the 2000 presidential election focused attention on ballots received in Florida from military and overseas voters under the provisions of UOCAVA, particularly the standards by which individual ballots were counted. After the election, then Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen directed the DoD Inspector General to investigate issues with military and overseas ballots in the election; a report was issued on June 22, 2001 ([http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/fy01/01145sum.htm]). More recently, both the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107; S. 1438) and the Help America Vote Act (P.L.107-252; H.R.3295) included provisions concerning military and overseas voting. The President signed P.L. 107-107 on December 28, 2001 and P.L. 107-252 on October 29, 2002. This report will be updated periodically to reflect new developments.

FDA Tobacco Regulation: The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009

Thu, 28 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The 111th Congress is considering legislation that would give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) broad new statutory authority to regulate the manufacture and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). On April 2,2009, the House passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (H.R. 1256; H.Rept. 111-58, part 1 and 2). On May 20, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions approved an almost identical bill (S. 982). Similar legislation was first introduced in the 10Sth Congress and passed the Senate in 2004 and the House in 200S with strong bipartisan support. The Administration strongly supports H.R. 1256/S. 982. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would create a new FFDCA Chapter IX solely for the regulation of tobacco products. While the bill's language draws extensively on the FFDCA's existing provisions for regulating pharmaceutical products and medical devices, tobacco products would be regulated under new legal authority based on a public health standard rather than the safety and effectiveness standard by which the FDA regulates drugs and devices. Under the new language, FDA would have to demonstrate that any proposed tobacco product regulation was appropriate for the protection of public health, taking into consideration the risks and benefits to the population as a whole. Among its many provisions, H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require all tobacco product manufacturers to register with FDA. All registered facilities would be inspected every two years. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require the FDA to reissue its 1996 tobacco rule, which was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000. The rule would place new restrictions on youth access to tobacco products, end all remaining brand-name sponsorship of sporting and other entertainment events, and limit tobacco advertising in publications with a significant youth readership to black-on-white text only. In addition, the existing health warnings on tobacco product packaging and advertising would be replaced with more explicit and conspicuous health warnings. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would give FDA the authority to develop regulations restricting the sale, distribution, advertising, and promotion of tobacco products, to the extent permitted by the First Amendment. The agency also would have the authority to require changes in the design and characteristics of current and future tobacco products, such as the reduction or elimination of harmful ingredients and additives. FDA would not have the authority to reduce nicotine yields to zero or ban tobacco products. Under H.R. 1256/S. 982, manufacturers would have to obtain FDA approval in order to market a new tobacco product, unless FDA determined that it was substantially equivalent to a product already on the market, or a minor modification of an existing product. The bill would prohibit the use of descriptors such as "light" and "mild" and require manufacturers seeking FDA approval to market a product for which they intend to make a reduced-risk claim to provide evidence substantiating that claim. H.R. 1256/S. 982 would require FDA to develop new requirements for testing and reporting tobacco product ingredients and smoke constituents, and to issue new recordkeeping requirements to help counter the illicit trade of tobacco products. FDA's new regulatory activities would be paid for by user fees assessed on the manufacturers. This report provides a detailed summary of the provisions in H.R. 1256/S. 982 and discusses some of the public health and legal issues it raises. A companion report, CRS Report R40196, FDA Tobacco Regulation: History ofthe 1996 Rule and Related Legislative Activity, 1998-2008, by C. Stephen Redhead and Vanessa K. Burrows, provides more background on the FDA rule and past efforts to give the agency the authority to regulate tobacco products.

The State Secrets Privilege and Other Limits on Litigation Involving Classified Information Edward C. Liu

Thu, 28 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The state secrets privilege is a judicially created evidentiary privilege that allows the government to resist court-ordered disclosure of information during litigation, if there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure would harm the national security of the United States. The Supreme Court first described the modern analytical framework of the state secrets privilege in the 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds. In its opinion, the Court laid out a two-step procedure to be used when evaluating a claim of privilege to protect state secrets. First, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. Second, a court must independently determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. If the privilege is appropriately invoked, it is absolute and the disclosure of the underlying information cannot be compelled by the court. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) provides pretrial procedures that permit a trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility involving classified information before introduction of the evidence in open court. The use of classified evidence may also implicate criminal defendants rights to exculpatory information and witnesses statements held by the prosecution, or their right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. Congressional action may affect the operation or coverage of the state secrets privilege. In 2008, a federal district court held that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act supplanted the state secrets privilege with respect to civil claims of unlawful electronic surveillance. In the 111th Congress, House and Senate versions of bills entitled the State Secrets Protection Act, H.R. 984 and S. 417, have been introduced to codify the privilege. The bills would additionally limit the privilege to cases where significant harm to national security was presented, require judicial review of the actual information claimed to be privileged, and require the Attorney General to report to Congress within 30 days of any invocation of the state secrets privilege.

Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines: International Trade Issues

Thu, 28 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

A patent, which is a form of intellectual property right (IPR), is a legal, exclusive right granted for the invention of a new product, process, organism, design, and plant. It allows the right holder to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention for a period of 20 years. Patents constitute the most common method for governments to encourage research and development (R&D) in order to find pharmaceutical treatments and cures for diseases and other illnesses. IPR protection and enforcement have evolved from an area primarily of national concern to an area of international trade policy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) established minimum standards for IPR protection and enforcement. The U.S. government considers the protection and enforcement of international IPR standards, including those for patents, to be an important goal of U.S. trade policy for economic, health and safety, and national security reasons. As such, the United States has pursued strong IPR regimes through multilateral, regional, and bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations and unilateral trade policy tools, namely the Special 301 process and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). IPR provisions in trade policies are among the range of social, economic, and political factors that may affect public health, including the ability of countries to deliver health services to their populations. Patents, through their possible impact on innovation and drug prices, may affect access to existing medicines and the development on new medicines. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), about one-third of the worlds population, primarily those residing in poorer parts of Africa and Asia, lacks regular access to essential medicines. While the United States places priority on promoting a strong international IPR regime, some Members of Congress have expressed concern over how to balance the goals of providing long-term incentives for innovation through patents and addressing the short-term need to provide affordable access to medicines. This report focuses on the relationship between IPR provisions in international and U.S. trade policy and access to medicines. This issue represents one component of a broader debate about the relationship between trade policy and public health. Possible issues of interest for Congress include incorporating public health concerns into the U.S. trade policy advisory process, developing new U.S. trade policy guidance on public health, considering the implications of the U.S. strategy on IPRs and trade for U.S. access to medicines, and reviewing the range of options utilized for expanding global access to medicines. This report will be updated periodically as warranted by events.

Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Thu, 28 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq; Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic U.S. objectives include promoting democratization, free markets, human rights, and energy development. Administration policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. The Administration's diverse goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in the region. Some call for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some dispute the importance of energy resources in the region to U.S. national security. Others argue that the risks posed by civil and ethnic tensions in the region outweigh the benefits of U.S. involvement. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of "Silk Road" language in 1999 (P.L. 106113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in South Caucasian and Central Asian states. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 was signed into law November 14, 2005 (P.L. 109-102). Conferees (H.Rept. 109-265) called for $25 million in Freedom Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25 million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to Tajikistan, $5 million to Turkmenistan, and $20 million to Uzbekistan. The law continues prior year language conditioning aid to the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on progress in democratization and respect for human rights and adds that the Uzbek government should permit an international investigation of the mid-2005 violence against civilians in Andijon. This CRS report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests.

Iraq: Summary of U.S. Casualties

Thu, 28 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The following casualty table was compiled by the Department of Defense, as tallied from DOD press releases. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as all records are processed through the U.S. military's casualty system. This report will be updated semiweekly, but more frequent updates are available at DOD's Web site at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/]. Click on "OIF Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary which includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD Web site: [http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/OIF-Total.pdf].

Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Control: Selected Proposals in the 111th Congress

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Control: Selected Proposals in the 111th Congress Congressional Research Service Summary As of the date of this report, Members in the 111th Congress have introduced seven stand-alone proposals that would control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The proposals offered to date would employ market-based approacheseither a cap-and-trade or carbon tax system, or some combination thereofto reduce GHG emissions. The legislative proposals are varied in their overall approaches in controlling GHG emissions. Some control emissions by setting a quantity (or cap); others control emissions by setting a price (or tax/fee). In addition, the proposals differ in their inclusion of particular design elements, such as whether or not to allow offsets (emission reduction opportunities from economic sectors not directly addressed by the primary approach). H.R. 2454 (Waxman/Markey) has been the primary energy and climate change legislative proposal in the 111th Congress. It was introduced May 15, 2009, and subsequently modified and offered as a Managers Amendment (May 18, 2009) for markup in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. After making several amendments to the bill (most relating to the bills energy provisions), the committee ordered the bill reported May 21, 2009. H.R. 2454 (Waxman/Markey) and H.R. 1862 (Van Hollen) would establish cap-and-trade programs, but they would differ in their implementation. For example, the latter would not allow offsets to be used for compliance purposes, while the former would allow covered entities to satisfy an increasing percentage (approximately 30% in 2012) of their compliance obligation with offsets. H.R. 1666 (Doggett) would also create a cap-and-trade system, but in the early years of the program, the number of emission allowances distributed would be based on achieving a specified allowance price. Three of the proposalsH.R. 594 (Stark), H.R. 1337 (Larson), and H.R. 2380 (Inglis)would use a carbon tax approach to address carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion. H.R. 1683 (McDermott) would establish a program that may be described as a dynamic carbon tax: its tax rate would be linked with annual emission allocations (or caps). A key element in GHG emission reduction bills is how, to whom, and for what purpose the value of emission allowances or carbon tax revenue would be distributed. The distribution strategy is a critical policy decision, because it would affect (1) the overall cost of the program and (2) how program costs are distributed throughout the economy. In the early years of the program, H.R. 2454 would distribute allowances at no cost to both covered and non-covered entities to support various policy objectives. In addition, an increasing percentage (approximately 18% in 2016) of the allowances would be sold through auction. As with the distribution of no-cost allowances, auction revenues would be used to further various policy objectives.

Mexico's Drug-Related Violence

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Drug-related violence in Mexico has spiked in recent years as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have competed for control of smuggling routes into the United States. Drug trafficking issues are prominent in Mexico because the country has for at least four decades been among the most important producers and suppliers of heroin, marijuana and (later) methamphetamine to the U.S. market. Today it is the leading source of all three drugs and is now the leading transit country for cocaine coming from South America to the United States. Although previous Mexican governments had accommodated some drug trafficking in the country, when President Felipe Caldern came into office in December 2006 he made battling the Mexican drug trafficking organizations a top priority. He has raised spending on security and sent thousands of troops and federal police to combat the DTOs in states along the U.S.-Mexico border and throughout the country. In response to the governments crackdown, the DTOs have responded with escalating violence. In recent years, drug trafficking violence in Mexico has claimed thousands of lives and reached a level of intensity and ferocity that has exceeded previous periods of drug-related violence. The governments intensified campaign against the DTOs resulted in changes in the structure of these criminal organizations. The seven major DTOs in Mexico have reconfigured. The fracturing of some of the most powerful drug trafficking syndicates and the reemergence of once powerful DTOs have led to bloody conflict within and among the DTOs. Today a small number of DTOs control the lucrative drug trafficking corridors through which drugs flow north from Mexico into the United States and high-powered firearms and cash flow south fueling the narcotics trade. President Caldern has demonstrated what has been characterized as an unprecedented willingness to cooperate with the United States on counterdrug measures. In October 2007, both countries announced the Mrida Initiative to combat drug trafficking, gangs and organized crime in Mexico and Central America. To date, the U.S. Congress has appropriated a total of $700 million for Mexico under the Mrida Initiative. The program, which combines counternarcotics equipment and training with rule of law and justice reform efforts, is still in its initial stages of implementation. The scope of the drug violence and its locationmuch of it in northern Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico borderhas been the subject of intense interest in Congress. The 111th Congress has held more than a dozen hearings dealing with the increased violence in Mexico as well as U.S. foreign assistance and border security efforts. This report examines the causes for the escalation of the violence in Mexico. It provides a brief overview of Mexicos counterdrug efforts, a description of the major DTOs, the causes and trends in the violence, the Caldern governments efforts to crackdown on the DTOs, and the objectives and implementation of the Mrida Initiative as a response to the violence in Mexico. For related information about Mexico and the Mrida Initiative, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R40135, Mrida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues. For more information on international drug policy, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Identity Theft: Trends and Issues

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In the wake of the economic downturn, policymakers are increasingly concerned with securing the economic health of the United Statesincluding combating those crimes that threaten to further undermine the nations financial stability. Identity theft is one such crime. It is the fastest growing type of fraud in the United States; in 2008 about 9.9 million Americans were reportedly victims of identity theft, an increase of 22% from the number of cases in 2007. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that it costs consumers about $50 billion annually. Identity theft is often committed to facilitate other crimes such as credit card fraud, document fraud, or employment fraud, which in turn can affect not only the nations economy but its security. Consequently, in securing the nation and its economic health, policymakers are also tasked with reducing identity theft and its impact. Congress continues to debate the federal governments role in (1) preventing identity theft and its related crimes, (2) mitigating the potential effects of identity theft after it occurs, and (3) providing the most effective tools to investigate and prosecute identity thieves. With respect to preventing identity theft, one issue concerning policymakers is the prevalence of personally identifiable informationand in particular, the prevalence of social security numbers (SSNs)in both the private and public sectors. One policy option to reduce their prevalence may involve restricting the use of SSNs on government-issued documents such as Medicare identification cards. Another option could entail providing federal agencies with increased regulatory authority to curb the prevalence of SSN use in the private sector. In debating policies to mitigate the effects of identity theft, one option Congress may consider is whether to strengthen data breach notification requirements. Such requirements could affect the notification of relevant law enforcement authorities as well as any individuals whose personally identifiable information may be at risk from the breach. There have already been several legislative and administrative actions aimed at curtailing identity theft. Congress enacted legislation naming identity theft as a federal crime in 1998 (P.L. 105-318) and later provided for enhanced penalties for aggravated identity theft (P.L. 108-275). In April 2007, the Presidents Identity Theft Task Force issued recommendations to combat identity theft, including specific legislative recommendations to close identity theft-related gaps in the federal criminal statutes. In a further attempt to curb identity theft, Congress directed the FTC to issue an Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (effective November 1, 2009), requiring that creditors and financial institutions with specified account types develop and institute written identity theft prevention programs. Multiple federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Postal Inspection Service; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, are involved in investigating identity theft. Further, prosecutions and convictions of identity theft and aggravated identity theft cases have continued to increase since becoming federal crimes. In line with this trend, there has been a general increase in the number of identity theft complaints to the FTC as well in the number of reported data breaches placing personally identifiable information at risk. This report will be updated as needed.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for Congress

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was created in 1994 to bridge the gap between emergency disaster relief programs and long-term development assistance. The program is relatively small, with regular appropriations averaging $40-$60 million annually and a full-time staff of about 50. Supplemental funding and transfers from other foreign assistance accounts, particularly through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have at times substantially increased the programs funding levels. Congress may take particular interest in OTI this year, as the Administrations FY2010 budget proposal requests $126 million for the Transition Initiatives account, a 150% increase over the 2009 estimate. OTIs legislative authority is based on the disaster relief provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which allows for broad executive discretion. This freedom from administrative requirements, intended to enhance the programs rapid response capability, allows OTI to pursue a wide range of activities but also reduces program transparency and, according to some, accountability. OTI has been active in 36 countries since its inception, and program focus varies widely from country to country. Typical activities include reintegrating combatants in a post-conflict environment through employment programs, providing equipment and technical support for independent media organizations, organizing civic forums, and supporting small, community-led infrastructure projects intended to show quick and tangible benefits from transitions toward peace and democracy. Most OTI grants are small and in-kind, ranging in value from $5,000 to $50,000, though much larger grants have been approved. There is considerable congressional interest in and support for strengthening capacities at USAID and other civilian agencies involved in foreign affairs. In its 15 years in operation, OTI has served in part as a laboratory within USAID to try innovative approaches to development, and there may be a range of lessons to be learned from the program that are applicable to this broader debate. The 111th Congress may wish to consider several aspects of the OTI program, from personnel structure and contracting mechanisms to coordination with other U.S. assistance programs, as part of oversight or legislated reform activities concerning OTI, USAID, or foreign assistance in general.

Factors Affecting the Demand for Long-Term Care Insurance: Issues for Congress

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Factors Affecting the Demand for Long-Term Care Insurance: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service Summary As the 78 million baby boomers approach retirement, many are concerned they will not have sufficient savings to sustain their standard of living in retirement. Few, however, may be focused on another risk to their retirement securitythe potential cost of financing often expensive long-term care (LTC) services. Long-term care services include help with a either a functional or cognitive impairment and generally include assistance with activities such as bathing, eating, and dressing. For the majority of older Americans, the cost of obtaining paid help for these services may far exceed their financial resources in the future. Private long-term care insurance (LTCI) is available to provide some financial protection for persons against the risk of the potentially high cost of LTC. Yet, only 7% of LTC spending was paid by LTCI in 2007. This low rate of financing reflects relatively low demand for LTCI over the past few decades. Moreover, for those who do own a policy most have not yet reached the age where they may need services. A number of factors have adversely affected the demand for LTCI. The cost and complexity of LTCI policies have been cited as major deterrents to purchasing LTCI. In addition, increased concerns have arisen about the adequacy of consumer protections for LTCI as a result of inconsistencies in LTCI laws and regulations across the states. More recently, adverse publicity about potential problems with claims denials and heightened concerns about the future solvency of LTCI insurers in the current economic environment have further dampened demand. The private LTCI market has undergone significant changes in the past three decades. For example, the employer-sponsored market has grown as a share of total LTCI sales and the overall market has become more concentrated in terms of the number of companies selling the product. Further, policies have become more comprehensive in terms of services covered and inflation protection, but this has also increased LTCI premiums. Finally, a number of newer product lines have been introduced that combine LTCI with other retirement and life-insurance products. The 111th Congress has introduced a number of legislative proposals aimed at increasing participation in the voluntary LTCI market. These include proposals to: increase tax incentives to lower the after-tax cost of policies; improve consumer protections to boost consumer confidence in the product; provide a publicly-administered long-term care insurance product; and expand consumer education. This report will discuss the role of LTCI in financing LTC costs and current trends in the LTCI industry; factors affecting the demand for LTCI, including cost and complexity of the product and adequacy of consumer protections; and key features of legislative proposals in the 111th Congress to address these issues.

The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

A primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, Department) is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Following a major reorganization of the DHS (called the Second Stage Review, or 2SR) in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local, and private sector partners. Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Departments intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored that importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. At the outset of the new Administration, the DHS Intelligence (DHSI) enterprise consists of I&A, two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). As the Obama Administration fills key positions within DHS and I&A, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Departments intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHSI produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. In addition, this year, the Department will produce its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment that outlines its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Departments programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The results of the QHSR will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for the Department. This report provides an overview of DHSI both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHSI is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; and support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options that Congress may consider on certain issues. This report may be updated.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

North Korea's decisions at the end of 2002 to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its multiple missile tests of July 4, 2006, create a foreign policy problem for the United States. Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent to stage a "nuclear breakout" of its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons. North Korea's actions follow the disclosure in October 2002 that North Korea is operating a secret nuclear program based on uranium enrichment and the decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials stated that North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the fuel rods and may have produced 4-6 atomic bombs from them. The main objective of the Bush Administration is to secure the dismantling of North Korea's plutonium and uranium-based nuclear programs. Its strategy has been: (1) terminating the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding U.S. reciprocal measures until North Korea takes steps to dismantle its nuclear programs; (3) assembling an international coalition, through six party negotiations, to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea; and (4) imposing financial sanctions on foreign banks that facilitate North Korea's illegal counterfeiting activities. China, South Korea, and Russia have criticized the Bush Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they voice opposition to economic sanctions and to the potential use of force against Pyongyang. China, Russia, and South Korea increasingly have expressed support for North Korea's position in six-party talks. The talks have made little progress. North Korea's two long boycotts of the talks (the current one since November 2005 is continuing) appears aimed at creating a longterm diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue. In the six party meetings of JulySeptember 2005, North Korea widened the gap between the U.S. and North Korean positions when it asserted that it would not dismantle or even disclose its nuclear programs until light water reactors were physically constructed in North Korea. The widening gap was not narrowed by a statement of the six parties on September 19, 2005, in which North Korea agreed to rejoin the NPT and its 1992 safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency "at an early date" but which also contained a reference to North Korea's right to have a light water reactor. Critics increasingly have charged that despite its tough rhetoric, the Bush Administration gives North Korea a relatively low priority in U.S. foreign policy and takes a passive diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue and other issues. As a result of growing congressional criticism, the Senate approved an amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill for FY2007 that would require President Bush to name a high level coordinator of U.S. policy toward North Korea and report to Congress on the status of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. This report replaces IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry A. Niksch. It will be updated periodically.

Gun Control: Statutory Disclosure Limitations on ATF Firearms Trace Data and Multiple Handgun Sales Reports

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

For FY2003-FY2006, riders on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) appropriations have prohibited that agency from disclosing firearm trace data (based on firearm transfer records maintained in part by licensed gun dealers) and multiple handgun sales reports data for any purpose other than supporting a bona fide criminal investigation or agency licensing proceeding. This rider is known as the "Tiahrt" amendment, for its sponsor in full committee markup of the FY2004 Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, Representative Todd Tiahrt. Members have introduced legislation to overturn the FY2006 appropriations rider (see S. 2460/H.R. 5033 and S. 2629). Nevertheless, a similar rider may be included in the FY2007 ATF appropriations language. In addition, on May 18, 2006, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security approved a bill (H.R. 5005) that includes a provision to permanently codify this disclosure limitation.

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues

Wed, 27 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) is a three-country initiative that is intended to increase cooperation and information sharing in an effort to increase and enhance prosperity in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The SPP was endorsed by the leaders of the three countries, but it is not a signed agreement or treaty and, therefore, contains no legally binding commitments or obligations. The goals of the prosperity components of the SPP are to increase cooperation and sharing of information in order to improve productivity, reduce the costs of trade, and enhance the quality of life. The goal of the security components of the SPP is to coordinate the security efforts undertaken by each of the three participating nations to better protect citizens from terrorist threats and transnational crime while promoting the safe and efficient movement of legitimate people and goods. Congressional interest in the SPP concerns possible implications related to national sovereignty, transportation corridors, cargo security and border facilitation. This report will not be updated.

The 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) "Swine Flu" Outbreak: U.S. Responses to Global Human Cases

Tue, 26 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In April 2009, a novel influenza virus began to spread around the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) refers to the virus as Influenza A(H1N1). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other Administration officials refer to it as 2009 H1N1 flu. Throughout this report, the virus is referred to as H1N1. Although H1N1 does not appear to be as lethal as H5N1 avian influenza, which reemerged in 2005, the virus is slightly more lethal than seasonal flu and it continues to spread. Researchers are not yet clear to what extent H1N1 transmission will continue spread or how virulent the virus will be ultimately. As of May 26, 2009, WHO confirmed that nearly 13,000 human cases of H1N1 had occurred in more than 40 countries, including 92 deaths. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and WHO agree that there is no risk of contracting the virus from consuming well-cooked pork or pork products. WHO asserts that limiting travel and imposing travel restrictions would minimally affect the spread of the virus, but would be highly disruptive to the global community. The strain of H1N1 circulating the globe is treatable with two antiviral drugs, oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu) and zanamivir (brand name Relenza), though there is no available vaccine. WHO has been maintaining a global stockpile of approximately 5 million adult treatment courses of oseltamivir that were donated by manufacturers and donor countries. This stockpile was initiated after the onset of H5N1 bird flu outbreaks. WHO has already distributed some of the treatments through the WHO Regional Offices and is distributing 3 million treatment courses from the stockpile to developing countries in need. As of May 18, 2009, the United States had provided more than $16 million to assist countries respond to H1N1 outbreaks. Global responses by U.S. agencies to H1N1 are conducted primarily by CDC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), though DOD does provide some support to global aid. CDC has sent experts to Latin America and the Caribbean to help the countries strengthen laboratory capacity and train health experts. HHS has already sent 400,000 treatment courses to Mexico, accounting for less than 1% of the total American stockpile. In total, the Administration aims to provide 2 million courses to Mexico. USAID announced on April 28, 2009, that it would provide an additional $5 million to WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) for interventions against H1N1 in Mexico and Central America. To date, USAID has provided $6.2 million for international H1N1 assistance. The assistance includes support to FAO for animal surveillance efforts in Mexico and other parts of Central America, and the provision of personal protection equipment (PPE) kits from its avian and pandemic influenza stockpile to prevent first responders from contracting or spreading the disease. In May 2009, it distributed more than 100,000 PPE kits in Mexico City and announced that it had already pre-positioned 400,000 PPE kits in 82 countries in preparation of a possible influenza pandemic. Investments that the United States and other stakeholders have made to prepare for a possible influenza pandemic, and to monitor the spread of other infectious diseases, have been applied to the most recent global response to H1N1. While health experts have made considerable gains against the disease, questions remain. Some health experts are concerned that poorer countries may not yet have the capacity to sufficiently monitor and respond to H1N1. Others warn that H1N1 transmission might accelerate in winter months. Questions still remain about whether the disease can change or reassort, particularly should outbreaks in countries simultaneously contending with H5N1 bird flu cases occur (such as Egypt, Vietnam, and Indonesia).

Political Turmoil in Thailand and U.S. Interests

Tue, 26 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Thailand has been destabilized by years of political turmoil since a military coup deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006. Mass demonstrations on both sides of the political divide have disrupted tourism and business in the kingdom, and twice forced the postponement of an international Asian leaders summit. Since late 2008, a new coalition government has struggled to hold on to power by offering conciliatory gestures to the opposition and avoiding a violent military crackdown. This report examines the governments performance, the role of the military, Thaksins impact on the situation, and the royal familys influence. It assesses the prospects for more elections, the degree of control exercised by the army over the civilian government, Thaksins activities and possible future in Bangkok, and the role of the palace in current Thai politics. As a formal U.S. treaty ally, Thailands situation holds implications for the United States. The instability of the past several years has made many question the reliability of Thailand as a major regional partner as well as cast doubt on Bangkoks commitment to democratic governance. Others argue that, despite the political turmoil, the well-established defense relationship remains very valuable to the United States, even as opportunities emerge with other Southeast Asian countries. The relevance of competition with China in the region and the impact of Thailands difficulties on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also examined. This report will not be updated. Tracking of current events in Thailand can be found in CRS Report RL32593, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, by Emma Chanlett-Avery.

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,

Tue, 26 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. This CRS Report discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. A table summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities for weapons proliferation. This report will be updated as warranted. Since 1991, China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported to Congress, China remains a "key supplier" of weapons technology -- particularly missile or chemical technology. Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. On ten occasions, the Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on PRC entities (not the government) for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to Pakistan and Iran. Among those sanctions, on September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports (for two years), after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000 promise. During preparations for the U.S.-PRC summit in October 2002, China, in August 2002, published the missile export controls promised in November 2000, but questions have persisted about China's enforcement of those regulations. On September 19, 2003, the State Department imposed more missile proliferation sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial firm, denying satellite exports to China for two more years, while waiving for one year the import ban on other PRC government products related to missiles, space, electronics, and military aircraft (sanctions that could affect $12 billion in imports from China). Critics say that President Bush has not forcefully pressed China's leaders on weapons nonproliferation. Meanwhile, Bush has sought China's help in a multilateral effort to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. In April 2004, the Commerce Department agreed to review whether to change China's "nonmarket economy" status, based upon which the "Helms Amendment" has broadened missile proliferation sanctions. The House International Relations Committee held a hearing on May 18, 2004, to question the Administration's support for China's membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector

Tue, 26 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Damage to or destruction of the nation's water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems has increased greatly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon. Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and operation responsibility are both public and private but are overwhelmingly non-federal. Since the attacks, federal dam operators and water and wastewater utilities have been under heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. There are no federal standards or agreedupon industry best practices within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and tools are ongoing since the 2001 terrorist attacks. This report presents an overview of this large and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since September 11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest. Policymakers are considering a number of initiatives, including enhanced physical security, better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how additional protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In response, Congress has provided $483 million in appropriations for security at water infrastructure facilities (to assess and protect federal facilities and support vulnerability assessments by non-federal facilities) for FY2002, FY2003 and FY2004, and passed a bill requiring drinking water utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments (P.L. 107-188). Congress also gave the newly created Department of Homeland Security responsibilities to coordinate information to secure the nation's critical infrastructure, including the water sector (P.L. 107-297). Continuing attention to these issues in the 108th Congress is anticipated. Current interest is focusing on bills concerning security of wastewater utilities (H.R. 866, S. 1039). This report will be updated as warranted.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments

Tue, 26 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program -- including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates -- and assesses current developments in verifying dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities as agreed in the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks include the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea, and were begun in August 2003 to attempt to resolve the current crisis over North Korean nuclear weapons. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads since 2002. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for selfdefense and that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under 1 kiloton. The United States and other countries condemned the test, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, that requires North Korea to (1) refrain from nuclear or missile tests, (2) rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and (3) abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party Talks to begin the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on denuclearization. Key components of the agreement include halting production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In July 2007, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors verified the shutdown of the Yongbyon facilities. On October 3, 2007, the Six Parties adopted a Joint Statement in which North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon facilities and provide a declaration of all its nuclear programs by December 31, 2007. The October 2007 statement said the United States would lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for those activities. Much still remains to be confirmed regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons production capabilities and delivery systems, particularly regarding uranium enrichment. Although U.S. officials confronted the North Koreans in 2002 with intelligence that reportedly proved that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, U.S. intelligence officials have said they do not know where the uranium program is based and have over time shown less confidence about what the scope of the program might be. Further, although seismographs registered the October 9, 2006, detonation and environmental sampling confirmed radioactivity, uncertainty about the weapon's design and sophistication remains. Additional transparency on fissile material stocks and programs, including the uranium enrichment program, may contribute to a better picture of North Korean nuclear weapons capabilities. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Service FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations

Fri, 22 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

On April 9, 2009, the White House sent Congress a request for $83.4 billion in supplemental appropriations for defense, foreign affairs, domestic fire fighting, and some other purposes for the remainder of FY2009. Of the total, $75.5 billion is for Department of Defense and intelligence activities related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; $3.7 billion, offset by $3.4 billion of rescissions, is for other defense programs; $7.1 billion is for international affairs; $250 million is for domestic fire fighting; $137 million is for national security-related programs in the Department of Energy and the Department of Justice, $2.9 million is for National Security Council Operations, and $72 million is for the Legislative Branch for Capitol Hill Police radios. These amounts are being requested in addition to $70 billion in FY2009 supplemental funding for defense and foreign affairs that Congress approved in June, 2008. In P.L. 110-252 (H.R. 2462), which was signed into law on June 30, Congress provided a supplemental defense bridge fund of $65.9 billion to cover costs of military operations through the first several months of FY2009 and also appropriated $4.0 billion in emergency supplemental FY2009 funds for foreign affairs. Amounts for defense in the bridge fund and in the regular FY2009 defense appropriations act, (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764), were expected to be sufficient to finance Army and Marine Corps operations through about June of this year. In testimony before the House Budget Committee on March 18, 2009, Defense Department Comptroller Robert Hale urged Congress to approve supplemental funding before the Memorial Day recess in order to avoid financial disruptions. The new request, together with the enacted $65.9 billion bridge fund, will bring total supplemental defense funding for FY2009 to $145 billion. Though this is a substantial amount, it is significantly less than $170 billion that Congress provided in FY2007 and $187 billion in FY2008. The decline does not reflect the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, which has only begun. Rather, the change is due almost entirely to a reduction in the amount requested for weapons procurement, which falls from $64 billion in FY2008 to $28 billion in FY2009. A large part of the decline in procurement, in turn, is due to a substantial cut in acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which were purchased in very large numbers in FY2008. In preliminary statements about the defense supplemental, Representative Murtha, the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senator Inouye, the Chairman of the Senate panel, both announced plans to add significant amounts to the request for major weapon systems. Additions that have been mentioned include funding for a new mid-air refueling tanker for the Air Force, the multi-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, one Navy E-2D radar plane, and Army Stryker wheeled armored vehicles. Funds might also be added to military personnel accounts to cover monthly stipends of up to $500 for service members prevented from leaving at the end of their enlistments by stop loss orders. The Administration request includes funds for 4 Air Force F-22 fighters, although on April 6, Secretary of Defense Gates announced plans to end the program. Funding for a new aerial tanker could be a matter of debate, particularly if the defense subcommittees provide that purchases be split between the two competing bidders.