http://opencrs.com Congressional Research Service reports and issue briefs recently added to the Open CRS database en http://opencrs.com/document/96-397 During the 1980s, the United States and Canada generally enjoyed very good relations. The early 1990s brought new governments to Ottawa and Washington, and although Canada's Liberal Party emphasized its determination to act independently of the United States when necessary, relations between the two countries continued to be generally cordial. Canada's new Conservative government, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, is regarded as more philosophically in tune with the Bush Administration than the Liberals were; some observers believe that this compatibility may facilitate bilateral cooperation. The two North American countries continue to cooperate extensively in international security and political issues, both bilaterally and through numerous international organizations. Canada's foreign and defense policies are usually in harmony with those of the United States. Areas of contention are relatively few, but sometimes sharp, as has been the case in policy toward Iraq. Since September 11, the United States and Canada have cooperated extensively on efforts to combat terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan. The United States and Canada maintain the world's largest trading relationship, one that has been strengthened during the past fifteen years by the approval of two multilateral free trade agreements. Although commercial disputes may not be quite as prominent now as they have been in the past, the two countries in recent years have engaged in difficult negotiations over items in several trade sectors, including natural resources, agricultural commodities, and the cultural/entertainment industry. However, these disputes affect but a small percentage of the total goods and services exchanged. Also, the United States and Canada work together closely on environmental matters, including monitoring solid waste transfers, and protecting and maintaining the quality of border waterways. Many Members of Congress monitor U.S.-Canada environmental, trade, and transborder issues that affect their states and districts. In addition, because the countries are similar in many ways, lawmakers in both countries study solutions proposed in the other to such issues as federal fiscal policy and federal-provincial power sharing. This report provides a short overview of Canada's political scene, its economic conditions, and its recent security and foreign policy, focusing particularly on issues that may be relevant to U.S. policymakers. This brief country survey is followed by several summaries of current bilateral issues in the political, trade, and environmental arenas. The report is updated annually. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/96-397 http://opencrs.com/document/98-684 This fact sheet tracks the current heads of government in Central and South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, and provides the dates of the last and next election for head of government. It also provides the national independence date for each country. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/98-684 http://opencrs.com/document/R40011 The U.S. has been involved in military operations in Iraq since March of 2003. The legal framework under which the U.S. has operated includes H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243), multiple Security Council Resolutions, as well as orders under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The U.N. Security Council extended the mandate for the multinational forces through December 31, 2008. On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to ?begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres.? Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties? intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory. On November 17, 2008, after months of negotiations, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iraq Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed two documents: (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq, and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq. The second agreement is commonly referred to as the SOFA between the United States and Iraq and is incorporated by reference into the larger strategic agreement. Congress has several tools by which to exercise oversight regarding negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of agreements by the United States and although the agreements with Iraq were negotiated and concluded as executive agreements, they have not been implemented. The agreements are not scheduled to be in force until January 1, 2009, and even then, there remain many unanswered questions about the specific terms within the SOFA. This report begins by discussing the historical legal framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq. The report then provides a general background as to the contents of agreements traditionally considered Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Finally, the report discusses specific aspects of the SOFA, highlighting issues that may require continued congressional oversight. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40011 http://opencrs.com/document/R40084 The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship, but have not agreed on whether to extend START or how to replace it. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40084 http://opencrs.com/document/R40121 Stop Loss is a frequently misunderstood DOD force management program that retains servicemembers beyond their contractually agreed-to separation date. Because of the involuntary nature of this extension, some critics have referred to the program as a ?backdoor draft? or ?involuntary servitude?. Stop Loss was initially used the 1990-91 Gulf War and later in Bosnia and the Kosovo Air Campaign. All of the Services used Stop Loss at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) but only the Army has consistently employed some form of Stop Loss over the past five years. Today, there are over 12,000 soldiers in the active Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard who remain on active duty beyond their scheduled separation date as a result of Stop Loss. While many observers tend to empathize with those in Stop Loss status, others assert that every servicemember who has enlisted or reenlisted over the past several years has been made aware of the program. The authority for Stop Loss has existed since 1984 (Section 12305, Title 10) and enables the President to suspend the laws relating to promotion, retirement and separation during periods of national emergency or a Presidential call-up of the reserve components. Minor changes to the Stop Loss program were enacted in 2002 and 2006. A more significant change was directed by P.L. 110-329, the FY2009 omnibus appropriations act which established and temporarily funded a new special pay, up to a maximum of $500 per month for all servicemembers extended by Stop Loss during FY2009. DOD?s implementing guidance for this special pay is being developed, but the plan must first be submitted to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations for approval. Details of this plan are not yet available. In January, 2007 the newly appointed Secretary of Defense Gates directed the Services to minimize the use of Stop Loss. The Army has consistently argued that Stop Loss is necessary to ensure that only trained and ready units are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, DOD officials concede that the Army will need to continue using Stop Loss, probably at least through 2009 or longer. With its continued use by the Army and the recent establishment of a special pay, it is anticipated that Stop Loss will be of significant and continuing interest to the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as necessary. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40121 http://opencrs.com/document/R40143 With increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, the extent of effects on the ocean and marine resources is an increasing concern. One aspect of this issue is the potential for seawater to become less alkaline (i.e., ocean acidification) as more CO2 dissolves in seawater, causing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater to increase. Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration could result in reduced growth or even death of shell-forming animals (e.g., corals, molluscs, and certain planktonic organisms) as well as disruption of marine food webs and reproductive physiology. Congress is beginning to focus attention on better understanding ocean acidification and determining how it might be addressed. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40143 http://opencrs.com/document/R40246 In light of lessons learned from the September 2001, terrorist attacks and other catastrophes such as Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav, the 111th Congress is expected to consider questions and issues associated with federal homeland security assistance. Federal homeland security assistance, for the purpose of this report, is defined as U.S. Department of Homeland Security programs that provide funding, training, or technical assistance to states, localities, tribes, and other entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from man-made and natural disasters. Since the nation is still threatened by terrorist attacks and natural disasters, the 111th Congress may wish to consider questions and challenges about whether, or how, federal homeland security assistance policy should be revisited. Policy solutions could affect, and be constrained by, existing law and regulations, and constitutional considerations. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated over $29 billion for homeland security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas. Originally, in FY2002, there were eight programs; in FY2009 there are 17 programs. This expansion and scope of homeland security assistance programs are the result of congressional and executive branch actions. The Grant Program Directorate, within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, administers these programs for the Department of Homeland Security. Each assistance program has either an all-hazards purpose or a terrorism preparedness purpose. However, in FY2009, 61% of funding has been appropriated for terrorism preparedness programs, a decision which has been criticized by some grant recipients, Members of Congress, and others. This report summarizes these programs, and identifies and analyzes potential issues for the 111th Congress. These issues include 1) the purpose and number of assistance programs; 2) the evaluation of the use of grant funding; 3) the determination of eligible grant recipients; 4) the programs funding amounts; and 5) the programs funding distribution methodologies. Some of these issues have been debated and legislation passed since FY2002. However, some observers, including Members of Congress and President Barack Obamas administration, have raised them as issues. This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40246 http://opencrs.com/document/R40470 Once a nomination to a U.S. circuit court of appeals or district court judgeship is submitted to the Senate by the President, the Senate almost invariably refers it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. If the Judiciary Committee schedules a vote on a nominee, it usually will vote on a motion to report the nomination favorably. However, the committee could also vote on a motion to report without recommendation, to report unfavorably, or to table the nomination. If the committee votes to reportwhether favorably, without recommendation, or unfavorablythe nomination moves to the full Senate. By contrast, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a nomination is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senates Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. On rare occasions, the Senate, when voting on confirmation, has rejected a circuit or district court nomination. In such cases, the nomination is then returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. Between 1939 and the adjournment sine die of the 110th Congress on January 2, 2009, 19 U.S. circuit or district court nominations received other than a favorable vote from the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. Among these 19 nominations were 6 (all to the district courts) that the Senate voted to reject the nomination and 18 on which the Judiciary Committee voted other than to report favorably. This report lists the votes cast by the Judiciary Committee and the Senate on each of the 19 nominations and identifies senatorial courtesy, ideological disagreement, and concern over nominees qualifications as among the circumstances that led to committee consideration of actions other than a favorable report. Senate and Senate Judiciary Committee actions on judicial nominations are discussed more generally in CRS Report RL31635, Judicial Nomination Statistics: U.S. District and Circuit Courts, 1977-2003 (out of print, available from CRS upon request); CRS Report RL31868, U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations by President George W. Bush During the 107th-109th Congresses; and CRS Report RL33953, Nominations to Article III Lower Courts by President George W. Bush During the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40470 http://opencrs.com/document/R40482 The State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations legislation provides annual funding for almost all of the international affairs programs generally considered as part of the 150 International Affairs Budget Function (the major exception being food assistance). In recent years, the legislation has also served as a vehicle for Congress to place conditions on the expenditure of those funds, and express its views regarding certain foreign policy issues. This report briefly discusses the legislation generally and then provides a short description of the various funding accounts as they appear in Division H, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009, of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40482 http://opencrs.com/document/R40506 As Congress considers legislation to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that contribute to climate change, attention has focused on cap-and-trade legislation. Such legislation would set a national cap on GHG emissions, with allowances (permits) to emit limited amounts of the gases distributed or auctioned to affected parties. Recently, there has also been discussion of taxes on greenhouse-gas-emitting substances (generally referred to as a carbon tax), which proponents argue would provide greater transparency and a clearer price signal. However the arguments over these options play out, enacting greenhouse gas controls is not simply a choice between cap-and-trade and carbon tax options. A third set of options, using the more traditional regulatory approaches of the Clean Air Act (CAA), is available. Unlike a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax, regulation under the Clean Air Act does not require new Congressional action. The ability to limit GHG emissions already exists under various CAA authorities that Congress has enacted, a point underlined by the Supreme Court in an April 2007 decision (Massachusetts v. EPA). Thus, controlling GHGs could follow a two-track approach, with Congress and the Administration pursuing new legal authority (for cap-and-trade, carbon tax, or whatever) at the same time that the Administration, through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), exercises existing authority under the Clean Air Act to begin regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. The key to using the Clean Air Acts authority is for the EPA Administrator to find that GHG emissions are air pollutants that endanger public health or welfare. Administrator Jackson proposed such an endangerment finding, April 17. A 60-day public comment period will begin upon publication of the draft finding in the Federal Register. Once an endangerment finding is finalized, the agency can proceed to regulate emissions from various sources of GHGs. EPA has received eight petitions asking that it make such findings and proceed to regulate emissions from mobile sources, including motor vehicles, aircraft, ships, nonroad vehicles and engines, and fuels, under Title II of the Clean Air Act. This report discusses EPAs authority under Title II and provides information regarding the mobile sources that might be regulated under this authority. Among these sources, motor vehicles (passenger cars and light trucks, including SUVs) are assumed to be the most likely initial targets for regulation, both because a petition addressing these sources began EPAs consideration of the endangerment issue, and because these are the most significant GHG emission sources among those covered by Title II. Regulation of GHGs from mobile sources might also lead the agency to establish controls for stationary sources, such as electric power plants. That option, the authority for which would come from different parts of the Clean Air Act, is not addressed in this report. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40506 http://opencrs.com/document/R40523 Almost all state and local governments sell bonds to finance public projects and certain qualified private activities. Most of the bonds issued are tax-exempt bonds because the interest payments are not included in the bondholders (purchasers) federal taxable income. In contrast, Tax Credit Bonds (TCBs) are a type of bond that offers the holder a federal tax credit instead of interest. This report explains the tax credit mechanism and describes the market for the bonds. Currently, there are a variety of TCBs. Qualified zone academy bonds (QZABs), which were the first tax credit bonds, were introduced as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) and were first available in 1998. Clean renewable energy bonds (CREBs) were created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) and new CREBs by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA P.L. 110-343). Gulf tax credit bonds (GTCBs) were created by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-135). Authority to issue GTCBs has expired. Qualified forestry conservation bonds (QFCBs) were created by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246). Qualified energy conservation bonds (QECBs) and Midwest Disaster Bonds (MWDBs) were created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, ARRA) included several bond provisions that use a tax credit mechanism. Specifically, ARRA created Qualified School Constructions Bonds (QSCBs) and a new type of bond that allows issuers the option of receiving a federal payment instead of allowing a federal tax exemption on the interest payments. These new bonds, Build America Bonds (BABs) and Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds (RZEDBs), are also unlike other tax credit bonds in that the interest rate on the bonds is a rate agreed to by the issuer and investor. In contrast, the Secretary of Treasury sets the credit rate for the other TCBs based on current market parameters. The authority to issue BABs and RZEDBs expires after 2010. Each TCB is designated for a specific purpose or type of project. Issuers use the proceeds for public school construction and renovation; clean renewable energy projects; refinancing of outstanding government debt in regions affected by natural disasters; conservation of forest land; investment in energy conservation; and for economic development purposes. All of the TCBs are temporary tax provisions. Additional legislation may be introduced in the 111th Congress that would extend, expand, or modify existing TCBs, or create new tax credit bonds. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40523 http://opencrs.com/document/R40566 Many of the issues surrounding Cuban migration are unique but not new. Normal immigration from Cuba has been elusive since Fidel Castro came to power. Over the past 50 years, the practice of Cubans fleeing by boat to the United States has become commonplace, and at some points reached the levels of a mass exodus. Since the last upsurge of boat people in the mid-1990s, the United States and Cuba worked toward establishing safe, legal immigration, which includes returning migrants interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard. These migration policies, however, are not without critics. The immigration of Cubans to the United States has increased since 1995, although the actual admission numbers have ebbed and flowed over this period. Cuba consistently ranks among the top 10 source countries for legal permanent residents (LPRs). Cuba ranked fifth as a top immigrant-sending countryafter Mexico, China, India, and the Philippinesin FY2008. A total of 49,500 Cubans became LPRs in FY2008. U.S. Coast Guard interdictions of Cubans have fluctuated since the mid-1990s, yet the general trend has moved upward. Cuban interdictions reached a 12-year high of 2,868 in FY2007. In FY2008, the U.S. Coast Guard reported 2,199 Cuban interdictions. Similarly, U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of Cubans peaked at 4,295 in FY2007 and slipped to 3,351 in FY2008. Cubans who arrived at ports of entry without documents exhibited a comparable pattern, reaching a high of 13,019 in FY2007 and falling slightly to 11,278 in FY2008. The change in leadership of both the United States and Cuba may provide openings for revisions in U.S. policy on Cuban migration. Fidel Castros departure as head of government in July 2006 has prompted some observers to call for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba overall, and a potential opportunity to restart the migration talks that had occurred semi-annually for a decade after the 1994 U.S-Cuba Migration Accord. After serving temporarily, Ral Castro, brother of Fidel Casto, officially assumed the Cuban presidency in February 2008. This transfer of power between the Castro brothers led some to question whether there would be much of an opening for renewed migration talks between the United States and Cuba. During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, however, President Barack Obama stated he would seek to change U.S. policy by allowing unlimited family travel and remittances to Cuba, signaling to some the possibility of resuming the migration talks. In his opening speech at the Summit of the Americas on April 17, 2009, President Obama expressed the hope of a new beginning with Cuba, specifically mentioning migration as an issue. A bipartisan group of congressional leaders are expressing support for a resumption of the migration talks with Cuba This report does not track legislation but will be updated if policies are revised. For a discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40566 http://opencrs.com/document/R40608 Airport Improvement Program (AIP): Reauthorization Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service Summary The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) has been providing federal grants for airport development and planning since the passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). AIP funding is usually spent on projects that support aircraft operations such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety or emergency equipment. The funds obligated for the AIP are drawn from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (hereafter referred to as the trust fund), which is supported by a variety of user fees and fuel taxes. The AIP is one of five major sources of airport capital development funding. The other sources are tax-exempt bonds, passenger facility charges (PFCs: a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and airport operating revenue. Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airports financial situation and the type of project being considered. Small airports are more dependent on AIP grants than large or medium-sized airports. The larger airports, whose projects tend to be much more costly, are more likely to participate in the tax-exempt bond market or finance capital development projects with a PFC. The multi-year authorization of the AIP under Vision 100Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) ended on September 30, 2007. Since then, a series of short-term extensions has authorized and provided funding for AIP, most recently through September 30, 2009 (P.L. 111-12). The AIP and PFC issues that have been considered during the ongoing debate regarding the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) include the national level of need for airport development and the appropriate AIP funding level; the appropriate federal role in airport development; the criteria for the distribution of funding across airports of different types and sizes; the sufficiency of AIP discretionary funding, especially for major capacity enhancing projects; airport privatization; defederalization of large airports; raising or eliminating the $4.50 ceiling now imposed on PFCs; the use and tax treatment of airport bonds; and noise mitigation funding and eligibility. During the FAA reauthorization debate, virtually all of the policy issues and options concerning AIP will be influenced by the broader budget issues of the adequacy of trust fund revenues and the availability of money for the FAA from the Treasury general fund. Should ample revenues be available, the reauthorization of AIP could maintain the programs structure and perhaps even increase AIP spending. A constrained-budget scenario would probably increase interest in such issues as defederalization or a tightening of program formula funding and eligibility criteria, which could provide cost savings. It could also increase interest in raising or eliminating the PFC ceiling, which could help airports fund more projects. This report is focused solely on AIP issues in the ongoing FAA reauthorization debate. To track the full FAA reauthorization debate, including legislative action on AIP and other FAA programs and activities, see CRS Report R40410, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization: An Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress, coordinated by Bart Elias. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40608 http://opencrs.com/document/R40612 Limitations on nuclear testing have been on the international agenda since 1954. The United States ratified one such treaty in 1963 and two in 1990 that together bar all but underground nuclear tests with an explosive yield of 150 kilotons or less. The United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992. In 1996, this nation signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. The Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999. That debate focused on such pros and cons as whether the United States could maintain its nuclear weapons without testing, whether it could verify compliance with the treaty, and how the treaty would affect nuclear nonproliferation. Another aspect to past debates was Safeguards, measures that this nation can take unilaterally within the treaty to protect its nuclear security. To compensate for disadvantages and risk they saw in the treaty regime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for the 1963 treaty on four Safeguards: an aggressive nuclear test program, maintaining nuclear weapon laboratories, maintaining the ability to resume atmospheric tests promptly, and improving intelligence and nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities. Safeguards were key to securing Senate ratification of the 1963 treaty. Updated Safeguards have been part of subsequent treaty ratification efforts. In April 2009, President Obama pledged to pursue U.S. CTBT ratification immediately and aggressively. A debate on the treaty would involve its pros and cons and how they have changed since 1999. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, examines such issues, but no prior CRS report examined the role of Safeguards in a future debate. Like pros and cons, Safeguards could affect Senators net assessment of the treaty; unlike pros and cons, they are amenable to legislative bargaining and compromise. As such, they may play a key role in a CTBT debate. To that end, Safeguards could be updated, such as by adding Safeguards for the nuclear weapon production plants and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures. While Safeguards may be part of a future CTBT debate, both supporters and opponents of the treaty could criticize them. Supporters may see augmented Safeguards as unneeded, arguing that the technical case for the treaty is stronger than in 1999. Many supporters favor further reductions and, ultimately, elimination of nuclear weapons, and view the CTBT as a stepping-stone in that direction; they could see revised Safeguards as moving in the opposite direction by supporting U.S. nuclear capabilities. Opponents assert that this nation cannot have confidence in its nuclear weapons or the program to maintain them without testing, and that nations could conceal nuclear tests. They hold that the United States has not adequately implemented existing Safeguards, and doubt it would do better with CTBT Safeguards. In their view, both the CTBT and inadequately-supported Safeguards would jeopardize U.S. security. This report may be updated occasionally. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40612 http://opencrs.com/document/R40614 The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing rights or the application of a host countrys laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty (i.e., as an executive agreement or a nonlegal political commitment). Occasionally, the substance and form of a proposed security agreement may become a source of dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In November 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, and contemplated a long-term presence by U.S. forces in Iraq. This announcement became a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern appeared to dissipate when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in an agreement that did not contain a long-term, legally binding security commitment by the United States, but instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. It is likely that future disputes will arise between the political branches regarding the entering or implementation of international security agreements. Regardless of the form a security arrangement may take, Congress has several tools to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background on the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Iraq. The report discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. For more information regarding the U.S.-Iraq security agreements, see CRS Report R40011, U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight, by R. Chuck Mason, and CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Agreements: Congressional Oversight Activities and Legislative Response, by Matthew C. Weed. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40614 http://opencrs.com/document/R40616 As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as net neutrality. There is no single accepted definition of net neutrality. However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Concern over whether it is necessary for policymakers to take steps to ensure access to the Internet for content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and if so, what these steps should be, is a major focus in the debate over telecommunications reform. Some policymakers contend that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that additional regulations would have negative effects on the expansion and future development of the Internet. Although most concede that networks have and will always need some management, the use of prioritization tools, such as deep packet inspection, as well as the initiation of metered/consumption-based billing practices have further fueled the debate. A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and the 111th Congress, to date, has not introduced stand-alone legislation to address this issue. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Provisions require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish ... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). It is anticipated that the NTIA will release these rules by summer 2009. The ARRA also requires the FCC to submit a report, containing a national broadband plan, to both the House and Senate Commerce Committees by February 2010. The FCC adopted, on April 8, 2009, a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to seek input from stakeholders as it begins to develop this plan. Included among the issues under discussion in the NOI is the question of the role of open networks. This report will be updated as events warrant. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40616 http://opencrs.com/document/R40619 A flu pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of an influenza virus. As such, the United States response to a flu pandemic would have both international and domestic components. Additionally, the domestic response effort would include contributions from every governmental level (local, state, tribal, and federal), non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. This report will focus largely on the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in supporting the nations domestic response effort, although it will also touch on DODs international role. The Department of State would lead the federal governments international response efforts, while the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services would lead the federal governments domestic response. The Department of Defense would likely be called upon to support both the international and domestic efforts. An analysis of the tasks assigned by the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan indicates that DODs role during a flu pandemic would center on the following objectives: assisting in disease surveillance; assisting partner nations, particularly through military-to-military assistance; protecting and treating US forces and dependents; and providing support to civil authorities in the United States With respect to providing support to civil authorities in the United States, the types of defense support which would likely be in greatest demand during a flu pandemic include: providing disease surveillance and laboratory diagnostics; transporting response teams, vaccines, medical equipment, supplies, diagnostic devices, pharmaceuticals and blood products; treating patients; evacuating the ill and injured; processing and tracking patients; providing base and installation support to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies; controlling movement into and out of areas, or across borders, with affected populations; supporting law enforcement; supporting quarantine enforcement; restoring damaged public utilities; and providing mortuary services. Note, however, that DODs ability to support these requests would be limited by its national defense and force protection responsibilities. The two principal ways in which defense support could be provided to civil authorities are by way of an immediate response, or in response to a formal request for assistance (RFA). Additionally, in extreme circumstances the federal government may expedite or suspend the RFA process and initiate a proactive federal response. National Guard personnel would almost certainly be involved in domestic response efforts as members of their state militia under the control of their governor. Current DOD plans do not anticipate federal mobilization of the National Guard or Reserves to respond to a flu pandemic. However, these plans could be modified if circumstances warranted it (for example, if the severity of the pandemic significantly exceeded DODs planning assumptions). In the event such a federal mobilization is contemplated, an important consideration would be the impact it would have on any response efforts that were already occurring at the state and local levels. For example, the activation of Reserve and National Guard medical personnel may pull them out of local hospitals where they are already engaged in the response effort, thereby undermining state and local response efforts. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40619 http://opencrs.com/document/R40620 Several bills (S. 590, H.R. 1959, and H.R. 2295) that would modify or expand statutory authorities granted to senior executives of the Department of Defense (DOD) have been introduced to the 111th Congress. These authorities relate to the exchange of real property, the outsourcing of some military installation support services, and the reimbursement by DOD of some costs associated with military site cleanup. The proposed legislation would also amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the BRAC law, to expand existing legal protections granted to those who have taken title to property at closed military bases and to set conditions under which future title transfers for surplus military property would be carried out at no cost to the recipient. S. 590 and H.R. 2295 are identical. If enacted, these bills would render permanent an expired authority held by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of a military department) to exchange any defense real property for real property held by non-DOD entities if the exchange will limit encroachment on military activities or will relieve a shortage of military housing. They would also expand and make permanent a limited pilot program that allows certain services currently performed at military installations by DOD employees or private contractors to be non-competitively outsourced to municipal or county governments. Another section in the bills would expand the authority of the Secretary of Defense to enter into a cost-reimbursement agreement for the cleanup of a military site. Current law permits agreements that reimburse federal, state, and local agencies and other entities for certain costs incurred by participation in a cleanup program. The bill would allow reimbursement agreements to include costs incurred in the processing of a transfer of title of federal property and would prevent the Secretary from imposing certain conditions on the funding made available. The remaining sections of the bills would amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the so-called BRAC law. They would expand the legal protections available to persons who have taken title to property on closed military bases and would require the conveyance of surplus military property at no cost if certain conditions are met. This report analyzes the key provisions of the legislation, identifies probable effects of the proposed amendments to existing law, and suggests issues raised for congressional consideration. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40620 http://opencrs.com/document/R40643 H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, was introduced May 15, 2009, by Representatives Waxman and Markey, and was subsequently modified (both technical and substantive changes) and ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 21, 2009. The bill was reported (amended) June 5 (H.Rept. 111-137, Part I). Among the major provisions of the bill are the following: H.R. 2454 contains provisions that would amend the Clean Air Act to establish a cap-and-trade system designed to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. The market-based approach would establish an absolute cap on the emissions and would allow trading of emissions permits (“allowances”). The bill achieves its broad coverage through an upstream compliance mandate on petroleum and most fluorinated gas producers and importers, and a downstream mandate on electric generators, industrial sources, and natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs). The bill allocates a substantial percentage of the allowances for the benefit of energy consumers and low-income households. As the program proceeds through the mid-2020s it shifts to more government auctioning with most of the proceeds returned to households. The bill’s allocation scheme includes free allowance allocations to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, merchant coal-fired electric generators, and petroleum refiners. An important cost control mechanism in the cap-and-trade program is the availability of domestic and international offsets. The bill contains energy efficiency provisions that cover grants, standards, rebates and other programs for buildings, lighting and commercial equipment, water-using equipment, wood stoves, industrial equipment, and healthcare facilities. H.R. 2454 contains several provisions related to vehicles and fuels, including incentives to produce plug-in vehicles and other advanced technology vehicles. Three percent of allowances from the greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program would be allocated to the automotive sector to provide grants to refit or establish plants to build plug-ins and other advanced vehicles. The bill would also establish a “cash-for-clunkers” program, providing new vehicle purchasers and lessees with vouchers worth up to $4,500 for a new, more efficient vehicle to replace an older, less efficient vehicle, and directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish greenhouse gas emissions standards for various transportation sectors. The bill requires EPA to develop a unified national strategy for addressing the key legal and regulatory barriers to deployment of commercial scale carbon capture and sequestration. The legislation would amend the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) to create an integrated energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard starting in 2011, requiring retail electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their electricity demand through renewable energy sources and energy efficiency by 2020. The bill provides for smart grid technologies, including products that can be equipped with smart grid capability, requirements for electric power retailers to reduce their peak loads using smart grid and other energy efficient technologies, and requirements that power suppliers ensure that utility smart grid systems will be compatible with plug-in electric drive vehicles. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/R40643 http://opencrs.com/document/RL30624 The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's highest priority aviation modernization program. It is replacing Navy F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18C/D Hornet combat aircraft. The decision to undertake F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was made during a period of great turbulence in Navy aviation modernization. During this time frame the Navy struggled to identify and implement the best way to modernize its aging fleet of F-14 fighters and A-6E attack aircraft. The A-12 program (a stealthy replacement to the A-6E) was terminated in January 1991. The AFX program, another proposed replacement for the A-6E, began in 1991, but was also terminated. The principal alternative to the F/A-18E/F was a modest upgrade of the F-14 -- a large, two-seat fighter designed in the 1960s, with potential air-to-surface attack capabilities. Some observers describe the F/A-18E/F as an upgraded and larger version of the F/A-18C/D, with increased range and payload capacity and more space and weight for future improvements. Others assert that the differences between the baseline Hornet aircraft and the E/F model are so great that they would describe the Super Hornet as an entirely new aircraft. The Department of Defense is currently facing a shortage of radar and communications jamming capability. The Navy and Marine Corp's EA-6B Prowlers escort and protect Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force aircraft operating in hostile airspace. The Prowlers, however, are few and rapidly aging.1 All the Services are evaluating preferred approaches to ameliorating this shortfall. The Navy's preferred approach is to produce a new electronic attack aircraft based on the F/A-18F, called the EA-18G. The Defense Department's Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) of December 31, 2004, estimated the acquisition cost of a 462-aircraft program at $43.98 billion. The cost of procuring 90 EA-18G electronic attack variants is estimated at $8.65 billion. The Super Hornet has been approved for international export, but no sales have been made as of July 2005. Key issues surrounding the program include how many Super Hornets should ultimately be procured, and management of the E/F multi-year procurement contract, and the commonality between the F and G variants. Sun, 21 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.com/document/RL30624