http://opencrs.cdt.org Congressional Research Service reports and issue briefs recently added to the Open CRS database en http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22873 The attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, coupled with the rise of militant transnational Islamism, have prompted both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress to reassess foreign policy in Africa and to begin to give considerable attention to Africa's Muslim populations and it's failed and failing states. Some experts have noted that Africa's failing and failed states may serve as a breeding ground for terrorists.1 In response to terrorist threats, the United States, in partnership with countries across Africa, has developed a range of strategies to help regional governments face the challenge of terror. Since September 11, 2001, the size of U.S. diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan African countries with large Muslim populations has increased. Presently, there are 45 active embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, including 16 new compounds built since 2001. Most recently, President Bush returned from a five-country visit to Africa, his second trip to the continent. Some observers view these trips as reflective of the Administration's focus, which has seen increasing American engagement with the continent in recent years.2 For further information on U.S. policy in Africa, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch; and CRS Report RL31772 U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, by Danielle Langton. Sat, 10 May 2008 15:33:43 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22873 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22872 After restoration of its independence in 1991 following decades of Soviet rule, Latvia made rapid strides toward establishing a democratic political system and a dynamic, free market economy. It achieved two key foreign policy goals when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. However, relations with Russia remain strained over such issues as the country's Russian-speaking minority and energy relations. Latvia and the United States have excellent relations. Latvia has deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and plays a significant role in efforts to encourage democracy and a pro-Western orientation among post-Soviet countries. This report will be updated as needed. Sat, 10 May 2008 15:33:33 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22872 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34478 Rising food prices are having impacts across the world, but especially among poor people in low-income developing countries. Since 2000, a year of low food prices, wheat prices in international markets have more than tripled, corn prices have doubled, and rice prices rose to unprecedented levels in March 2008. Such increases in food prices have raised concerns about the ability of poor people to meet their food and nutrition needs and in a number of countries have lead to civil unrest. More than 33 countries, most of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly affected by food prices increases. The World Bank has estimated that more than 100 million people are being pushed into poverty as a result of food-price escalation. A number of interrelated factors have been identified as causes of the rising food prices. Droughts in Australia and Eastern Europe and poor weather in Canada, Western Europe and Ukraine in 2007 have reduced available supplies. Reduced stocks have prompted many countries to restrict exports. Rising oil and energy prices have affected all levels of the food production and marketing chain from fertilizer costs to harvesting, transporting and processing food. Higher incomes in emerging markets like China and India have resulted in strong demand for food commodities, meat and processed foods and higher prices in world markets. Increased demand for biofuels has reduced the availability of agricultural products for food or feed use. Export restrictions in many countries have exacerbated the short supply situation. One immediate consequence of the rise in global food prices is the emergence of a shortfall in funding for international food aid. The World Food Program has launched an urgent appeal for $755 million to address a funding gap brought on by high food and fuel prices. WFP indicates that without additional funding it would have to curtail feeding programs that meet the needs of more than 70 million people in 80 countries. The United States has responded to the WFP appeal for food aid and its own food aid funding shortfall by announcing a release of $200 million from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT), a reserve of commodities and cash that can be used to meet unanticipated emergency food aid needs. Congress is considering an FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriation for emergency food aid requested by the Administration. The President announced on May 1, 2009 a request for Congress to appropriate an additional $770 million in FY2009 to deal with the international food situation. In addition to near-term measures to meet food needs in low-income countries, aid agencies are focusing on medium- and long-term efforts to enhance food security and agricultural productivity. There have been calls for increasing the priority and allocation of resources to agricultural development in poor countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank and USAID are two aid agencies that are promoting agricultural development and growth in low-income countries. Both indicate that African agricultural development should be a priority. Sat, 10 May 2008 15:33:19 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34478 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34477 The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). NASA has now asked Congress to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. Since 2005, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and countries over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush has praised Russian President Putin for his "leadership" in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. Sat, 10 May 2008 15:33:10 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34477 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22773 Controversy has arisen over the existence of so-called "sanctuary cities." The term "sanctuary city" is not defined by federal law, but it is often used to refer to those localities which, as a result of a state or local act, ordinance, policy, or fiscal constraints, limit their assistance to federal immigration authorities seeking to apprehend and remove unauthorized aliens. Supporters of such policies argue that many cities have higher priorities, and that local efforts to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, interfere with local law enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles. Opponents argue that sanctuary policies encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts. Pursuant to � 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193) and � 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208), states and localities may not limit their governmental entities or officers from maintaining records regarding a person's immigration status, or bar the exchange of such information with any federal, state, or local entity. Reportedly, some jurisdictions with sanctuary policies take a "don't ask, don't tell" approach, where officials are barred from inquiring about a person's immigration status in certain circumstances. Though this method does not directly conflict with federal requirements that states and localities permit the free exchange of information regarding persons' immigration status, it results in specified agencies or officers not possessing information that they could potentially share with federal immigration authorities. In the 110th Congress, several bills have been introduced that attempt to limit formal or informal sanctuary policies and induce greater sharing of immigration information by state and local authorities. These bills include H.R. 1355, H.R. 3494, H.R. 4192, H.R. 4065, S. 850, and S. 2294. Sat, 10 May 2008 15:32:57 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22773 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22754 Major events that are considered to be nationally significant may be designated by the President -- or his representative, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) -- as National Special Security Events (NSSE). Beginning in September 1998 through February 2007, there have been 27 events designated as NSSEs. Some of these events have included presidential inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, major sports events, and major international meetings. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating, planning, exercising, and implementing security for NSSEs, and was designated as the lead agency in P.L. 106-544. This report provides information on USSS legislative authority for NSSEs, NSSE designation funding and training, and NSSE funding. This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant. Legislative Authority. On May 22, 1998, President William J. Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62) -- "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas." PDD 62 established a framework for federal department and agency counter-terrorism programs, which addressed terrorist apprehension and prosecution, increased transportation security, enhanced emergency response, and enhanced cyber security. PDD 62 also designated specific federal departments and agencies as the "lead" agencies in the event of terrorist attacks.1 The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was designated as the lead agency with the leadership role in the planning, implementation, and coordination of operational security for events of national significance -- as designated by the President.2 Other lead agencies for counter Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:54 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22754 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22706 The Federal Protective Service (FPS) -- within U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) -- is responsible for protecting federal government property, personnel, visitors, and customers, including property leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS currently employs over 15,000 contract security guards to protect federal property. DHS intends, according to its FY2008 budget justification, to increase the use of contract security guards to focus FPS activities on maintaining security policy and standards, conducting building security assessments, and monitoring federal agency compliance with security standards. H.R. 2638 (FY2008 DHS appropriations) has provisions addressing FPS's use of contract security guards. This report will be updated as developments warrant. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:45 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22706 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22331 This report presents current data on estimated ownership of United States Treasury securities and major holders of federal debt by country. Federal debt represents the accumulated balance of borrowing by the federal government. To finance federal borrowing, United States Treasury securities are sold to investors. Treasury securities may be purchased directly from the Treasury on the secondary market in the United States or overseas by the individual private investors, financial institutions, and foreign, state, or local governments. Foreign investment in federal debt has grown in recent years, prompting questions on the location of the foreign holders and how much debt they hold. Federal debt represents, in large measure, the accumulated balance of federal borrowing of the United States government. The portion of gross federal debt held by the public consists primarily of investment in U.S. Treasury securities. Investors in the United States and abroad include official institutions such as the United States Federal Reserve, financial institutions such as private banks, and private individual investors. Table 1 below provides data available as of November 2005 on estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities by type of investment and the percentage of that investment attributable to foreign investors. As the table notes, during the past four years, foreign holdings of the public debt have increased more than the total privately held debt has increased. Foreign holdings of debt increased by $856.5 billion to nearly $1.9 trillion from December 2000 to December 2004. During the same period, total privately held debt increased by $786 billion to $3.7 billion.1 Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:32 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22331 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS21857 Foreign direct investment in the United States1 declined sharply after 2000, when a record $300 billion was invested in U.S. businesses and real estate. In 2004, according to preliminary data, foreigners invested about $100 billion. Foreign direct investments are highly sought after by State and local governments that are struggling to create additional jobs in their localities. In addition, many in Congress encourage such investment to offset the perceived negative economic effects of U.S. firms investing abroad. On a cumulative basis, the British remain the largest foreign direct investors in the U.S. economy, with French, Dutch, and Japanese investors trailing behind. This report will be updated as events warrant. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:23 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS21857 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS20748 The protection of classified national security and other controlled information is of concern not only to the executive branch, which determines what information is to be safeguarded for the most part,1 but also to Congress, which uses such information in fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. As a result, Congress has established procedures and mechanisms to protect controlled information in its custody. These arrangements, however, differ between the House and the Senate and among panels in each chamber. The Senate, for instance, has established an Office of Senate Security to centralize responsibility for personnel and information security, whereas the House has not created a chamber-wide counterpart. Proposals to change the system, some of which could prove controversial or costly, usually seek to set uniform standards or increase requirements for access. This report will be updated as conditions require. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:16 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS20748 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34450 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices originally governed by customary practice and bilateral agreements between States (i.e., countries). Article 36 of the VCCR provides that when a national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained in another signatory State, appropriate authorities within the receiving State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. Nevertheless, foreign nationals detained by U.S. state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information. Until March 2005, the United States was also a party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. Prior to U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the ICJ issued a judgment in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) (Avena), instructing the United States to review and reconsider the state convictions and sentences of 51 Mexican nationals who were not timely informed of their right to consular notification under VCCR Article 36, regardless of whether such review was otherwise barred by state procedural default rules. Although the United States subsequently withdrew from the Optional Protocol, the President thereafter issued a Memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decision in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Medell�n v. Texas. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the Court held that neither the judgment of the ICJ in Avena nor the President's Memorandum constituted enforceable federal law preempting state procedural default rules. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring with the Court's judgment, and Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter. For further background on issues related to VCCR Article 36, see CRS Report RL33613, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Recent Developments Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, by Michael John Garcia, and CRS Report RL32390, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Overview of U.S. Implementation and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Interpretation of Consular Notification Requirements, by Michael John Garcia. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:10 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34450 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34394 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. As of February 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992. There have been many calls worldwide for the United States and others to ratify the treaty. Many claim that it would promote nuclear nonproliferation; some see it as a step toward nuclear disarmament. Several measures have been introduced in Congress regarding the treaty; it might become an issue in the presidential election. The U.S. debate involves arguments on many issues. To reach a judgment on the treaty, should it come up for a ratification vote in the future, Senators may wish to balance answers to several questions in a net assessment of risks and benefits. Can the United States maintain deterrence without testing? The treaty's supporters hold that U.S. programs can maintain existing, tested weapons without further testing, pointing to 12 annual assessments that these weapons remain safe and reliable, and claim that these weapons meet any deterrent needs. Opponents maintain that there can be no confidence in existing warheads because many minor modifications will change them from tested versions, so testing is needed to restore and maintain confidence. They see deterrence as dynamic, requiring new weapons to counter new threats, and assert that these weapons must be tested. Are monitoring and verification capability sufficient? "Monitoring" refers to technical capability; "verification" to its adequacy to maintain security. Supporters hold that advances in monitoring make it hard for an evader to conduct undetected tests. They claim that any such tests would be too small to affect the strategic balance. Opponents see many opportunities for evasion, and believe that clandestine tests by others could put the United States at a serious disadvantage. How might the treaty affect nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament? Supporters claim that the treaty makes technical contributions to nonproliferation, such as limiting weapons programs; some supporters believe that nonproliferation requires progress toward nuclear disarmament, with the treaty a key step. Opponents believe that a strong nuclear deterrent is essential for nonproliferation, that nonproliferation and disarmament are unrelated, and that this nation has taken many nonproliferation and disarmament actions that the international community ignores. This report presents a detailed, comprehensive discussion of the treaty's pros and cons from a U.S. perspective. It contains an appendix outlining relevant history. It will be updated periodically with views from protagonists. CRS Report RL33548, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, tracks current developments. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:08:03 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34394 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33793 Iraq's neighbors have influenced events in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, and developments in Iraq have had political, economic, and security implications for Iraq's neighbors and the broader Middle East. Ongoing insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq and discussion of options for modifying U.S. policy toward Iraq are fueling intense consideration of Iraq's future and the current and potential policies of Iraq's neighbors. Policymakers and observers are considering a number of different "Iraq scenarios," ranging from the resolution of outstanding Iraqi political disputes and the successful consolidation of Iraq's government and security forces, to greater escalation of sectarian violence into nationwide civil war and the potential for greater intervention by Iraq's neighbors. Understanding regional perspectives on Iraq and the potential nature and likelihood of regional responses to various scenarios will be essential for Members of the 110th Congress as they consider proposed changes to U.S. policy, including the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), new Administration initiatives, and annual appropriations and authorization legislation. Proposals for more robust U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors, including currently problematic parties such as Iran and Syria, may be of particular interest to Members during the first session of the 110th Congress: the Iraq Study Group report asserted that Iraqis will not be able to achieve security and national reconciliation goals necessary to prevent a wider conflict without regional and international support. Press reports suggest that the Administration plans to strengthen security cooperation with some of Iraq's neighbors and that new arms sales and security assistance authorization and appropriations requests may be submitted to Congress to support these plans during 2007. This report provides information about the current perspectives and policies of Iraq's neighbors; analyzes potential regional responses to continued insurgency, wider sectarian or ethnic violence, and long-term stabilization; discusses shared concerns and U.S. long-term regional interests; and reviews U.S. policy options for responding to various contingencies. For more information on Iraq and regional perspectives, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security; CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq; and CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Influence in Iraq. This report will be updated to reflect major developments. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:55 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33793 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33704 Congress, through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides a variety of benefits and services to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits range from health care and related services to burial benefits. The veteran's basic eligibility for these programs and services is usually determined by the local VA office. Veterans not satisfied with the VA's decision(s) may wish to have them reviewed and may appeal the decision(s). This report traces the various steps involved in the appeal process -- starting with the original application for benefits and concluding with an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. A flow chart outlining all of the steps in the appeal process is provided. Following the filing of the initial appeal, the local VA office will either allow or disallow the claim. If the veteran/claimant wishes to appeal, a written request for appeal must be filed and various time deadlines and other requirements must be met prior to the case being considered by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). The appeal before the BVA may be a hearing at the local VA office by a traveling Board member; a hearing at the BVA office in Washington, DC; or a videoconference hearing at the local VA office. Various filing requirements and time limits must be met by the veteran/claimant in his/her appeal. There are specific guidelines for a person representing a veteran before the BVA. Legislation enacted in the 109th Congress changed traditional guidelines to allow for legal representation for veterans throughout the administrative appeals process. The veteran/claimant may appeal the decision of the BVA to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), which is an independent federal court and not part of the VA. The decision of the CAVC may be appealed by either the veteran/claimant or the VA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), an Article III court that sits in Washington, DC and has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases challenging CAVC rulings. Decisions of the Federal Circuit may be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has final jurisdiction. The VA has various statutory obligations to assist the veteran in the preparation of his/her application for benefits and any subsequent appeal(s). Among these obligations are assistance in the preparation of the initial application; provision of various records; medical exams; and other related issues. Certain legal and factual presumptions are established by statute that may be favorable to the veteran's claim. These issues are examined in the appendix to this report. Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress concerning the appeal process is summarized in the appendix. These bills are H.R. 67, H.R. 653, H.R. 797, H.R. 1435, H.R. 1444, H.R. 1490, H.R. 1538, H.R. 2257, H.R. 2855, H.R. 3047, H.R. 5089, S. 1283, S. 1363, and S. 2737. H.R. 1318 is also discussed. One of the bills, H.R. 797, has been enacted into law (P.L. 110-157). Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:47 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33704 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33701 In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In the north, the government of Uganda fought the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In recent months, the government and the LRA have entered into peace negotiations mediated by the government of Southern Sudan. The negotiations have had some limited success in halting the fighting through a negotiated ceasefire, but observers suggest criminal indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the LRA's leadership may limit the rebels' willingness to reach a final settlement. This report will be updated as significant changes occur in Uganda. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:39 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33701 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33620 Mercosur is the Common Market of the South established by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 1991 to improve political and economic cooperation in the region following a lengthy period of military rule and mutual distrust. On July 2, 2006, Venezuela acceded to the pact as its first new full member, making Mercosur the undisputed economic counterweight to U.S. trade policy in the region, but raising questions about how it may shift regional political and trade dynamics. Collectively, the Mercosur countries have a diversified trade relationship with the world. The United States is the largest trade partner, the European Union (EU) a close second, with each claiming about 25% of total Mercosur trade. By contrast, the four Mercosur countries together account for only 2% of total U.S. trade. Including U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil, the "Mercosur 5" constitute 3.5% of total U.S. trade. The Mercosur pact calls for an incremental path to a common market, but after 15 years only a limited customs union has been achieved. From the outset, Mercosur struggled to reconcile a basic inconsistency in its goals for partial economic union: how to achieve trade integration, while also ensuring that the benefits would be balanced among members and that each country would retain some control over its trade, production, and consumption structure. This delicate balance faced serious structural and policy asymmetries that became clear when Brazil and Argentina experienced financial crises and deep recessions. These economic setbacks disrupted trade flows among members, causing friction, the adoption of new bilateral safeguards, and a retreat from the commitment to deeper integration. For now, Mercosur has turned to expanding rather than deepening the agreement. Many South American countries have been added as "associate members" and Mercosur has reached out for other South-South arrangements in Africa and Asia. These are limited agreements and unlikely paths to continental economic integration. Internal conflicts have highlighted Mercosur's institutional weaknesses and slowed the integration process. Uruguay has diversified its trade more toward the United States, and is showing signs of reconsidering the benefits of an "exclusive" Mercosur trade arrangement. Venezuela's accession to the pact adds a decidedly anti-American factor and may complicate both Mercosur's internal balance and regional trade relationships. It appears Mercosur has opted for political cohesion over deeper economic integration. Mercosur, especially with Venezuela, will likely continue to resist movement toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), with Brazil in particular viewing the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the preferred alternative for achieving its trade policy goals. Given this impasse, it seems that the United States and Mercosur may continue to expand their influence through smaller trade agreements, presenting the possibility of two very different overlapping trading systems emerging in the Western Hemisphere centered around the U.S. and Brazilian economies. Few, if any, view this as an economically and administratively optimal alternative, presenting a formidable challenge to the future direction of U.S. trade policy in Latin America. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:31 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33620 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33572 With recent high energy prices and the passage of major energy legislation in 2005 (P.L. 109-58), there is ongoing congressional interest in promoting alternatives to petroleum fuels. Biofuels -- transportation fuels produced from plants and other organic materials -- are of particular interest. Ethanol and biodiesel, the two most widely used biofuels, receive significant government support under this law in the form of mandated fuel use, tax incentives, loan and grant programs, and certain regulatory requirements. The 17 programs and provisions listed in this report have been established over the past 27 years, and are administered by five separate agencies and departments: Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Internal Revenue Service, and Customs and Border Protection. These programs target a variety of beneficiaries, including farmers and rural small businesses, biofuel producers, petroleum suppliers, and fuel marketers. Arguably, the most significant federal programs for biofuels have been tax credits for the production or sale of ethanol and biodiesel. However, with the establishment of the renewable fuels standard (RFS) under P.L. 109-58, Congress has mandated biofuels use. In the long term, this mandate may prove even more significant than tax incentives in promoting the use of these fuels. This report outlines federal programs that provide direct or indirect incentives for biofuels. For each program described, the report provides details including administering agency, authorizing statute(s), annual funding, and expiration date. The Appendix provides summary information in a table format. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:21 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33572 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33539 To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence "consumers" -- ranging from the White House to cabinet agencies to military commanders -- must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence "targets" have been neglected. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships will remain complex, especially for Defense Department agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished. International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st century, presents a difficult analytical challenge. Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members have criticized the performance of the Intelligence Community in other instances. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate, remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is argued, is also essential. Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate, real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations will require changes in organizational relationships as well as acquiring necessary technologies. Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies. This report, which replaces Issue Brief IB10012 of the same name, will be updated as new information becomes available. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:07:14 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33539 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33494 The security classification regime in use within the federal executive branch traces its origins to armed forces information protection practices of the World War I era. The classification system -- designating information, according to prescribed criteria and procedures, protected in accordance with one of three levels of sensitivity, based on the amount of harm to the national security that would result from its disclosure -- attained a presidential character in 1940 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the initial executive order prescribing these information security arrangements. Refinements in the creation, management, and declassification of national security information followed over the succeeding decades, and continue today. In many regards, these developments represent attempts to narrow the bases and discretion for assigning official secrecy to executive branch documents and materials. Limiting the quantity of security classified information has been thought to be desirable for a variety of important reasons: (1) promoting an informed citizenry, (2) effectuating accountability for government policies and practices, (3) realizing oversight of government operations, and (4) achieving efficiency and economy in government management. Because security classification, however, was not possible for some kinds of information deemed in some quarters to be "sensitive," other kinds of designations or markings came to be applied to alert federal employees regarding its privileged or potentially harmful character. Sometimes these markings derived from statutory provisions requiring the protection of a type of information; others were administratively authorized with little detail about their use. In the current environment, still affected by the long shadow of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, several issues have arisen regarding security classified and controlled information. Volume is a concern: 8 million new classification actions in 2001 jumped to 14 million new actions in 2005, while the quantity of declassified pages dropped from 100 million in 2001 to 29 million in 2005. Expense is vexing: $4.5 billion spent on classification in 2001 increased to $7.1 billion in 2004, while declassification costs fell from $232 million in 2001 to $48.3 million in 2004, according to annual reports by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Some agencies were recently discovered to be withdrawing archived records from public access and reclassifying them. Critically evaluating this activity, ISOO has indicated that the federal government needs to apply a more integrated approach among the classifying agencies. The force of, and authority for, information control markings, other than security classification labels, have come under congressional scrutiny, prompting concerns about their number, variety, lack of underlying managerial regimes, and effects. Among those effects, contend the Government Accountability Office and the manager of the Information Sharing Environment for the intelligence community, is the obstruction of information sharing across the federal government and with state and local governments. These and related matters, including remedial legislation (H.R. 2331, H.R. 5112, H.R. 5441), are examined in this report, which will be updated as events warrant. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:06:35 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33494 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33471 The Library of Congress, as its name suggests, is a library dedicated to serving the United States Congress and its Members. It serves additionally as an unexcelled national library. The Library was located in the Capitol Building with the House of Representatives and the Senate until 1897, and its collections always have been available for use by Congress. Building upon a concept developed by the New York State Library and then the Wisconsin legislative reference department, Wisconsin's Senator Robert LaFollette and Representative John M. Nelson led an effort to direct the establishment of a special reference unit within the Library in 1914. Later known as the Legislative Reference Service, it was charged with responding to congressional requests for information. For more than 50 years, this department assisted Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private organizations, and individual scholars. In 1970, Congress enacted a law transforming the Legislative Reference Service into the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and directing CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to performing research and analysis that assists Congress in direct support of the legislative process. Joined today by two other congressional support agencies, including the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service offers research and analysis to Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS analysts work exclusively for Congress, providing assistance in the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, seminars, videotaped presentations, information obtained from automated data bases, and consultations in person and by telephone. This work is governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. Fri, 09 May 2008 19:06:15 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33471